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The Slavery Clause and Criminal
Disenfranchisement: How the Thirteenth Amendment
Informs the Debate on Crime-Based Franchise
Restrictions
Daniel R. Correa*
Criminal disenfranchisement persists as the only remaining franchise
exclusion of mentally competent adult citizens in the United States. The
practice itself disproportionally affects Black Americans, denying their
political efficacy, stripping them of the means to successful reentry into
society, and placing them in diminished citizenship status, sometimes
permanently. Challenges to the practice find little success, as the United
States Supreme Court has held constitutional permanent
disenfranchisement for crime pursuant to Section 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Though the Court’s holding in Richardson v. Ramirez
continues to receive great criticism, lower courts nonetheless affirm the
practice against various constitutional challenges, citing Richardson for
support.
The Thirteenth Amendment has not substantially factored into the
felony-disenfranchisement debate. In fact, the amendment lies mostly
dormant in theory and practice compared to the other Reconstruction
amendments. Yet the Thirteenth Amendment plays an indispensable role
that has been overlooked. This article argues that the Thirteenth
Amendment informs and advances three primary arguments against
criminal disenfranchisement: (1) The practice unconstitutionally
diminishes citizenship status; (2) Whether penal or nonpenal, the
practice unconstitutionally imposes status-based servitude; and (3) No
legitimate government interest is served by blanket criminal
disenfranchisement, though a compelling interest might be served by
disenfranchisement under specific, limited circumstances.
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“No pen can give an adequate description of the all-pervading
corruption produced by slavery.”1
INTRODUCTION
Unrest. Civil unrest. Social unrest. Across the United States, people
filled city streets, calling for reforms in the administration of justice. “I
can’t breathe”—the last few words uttered by George Floyd and others
whose lives were cut short by law enforcement officials—became a
rallying cry for government to loosen the stranglehold placed on Black
Americans by the legal system that purports to govern them.2 These calls
for reform and the ensuing unrest are not new. From enslavement to
emancipation to Reconstruction to the present, Black Americans have
endured public and private efforts to subdue and control them, waiting
for the very system that perpetuates their oppression to keep its promise
to ensure their personal and political freedom and to treat them equally
under law.
Black men disproportionately experience state-backed physical death
and imprisonment in the United States. A recent study found not only
that Black men and boys are 2.5 times more likely to die by police
violence than white men, but also that police violence is the sixth-leading
cause of death for young Black men, trailing accidental death, suicide,
other homicides, heart disease, and cancer.3 Black men are also 5.7 times
more likely—twelve times more likely for Black men ages eighteen to
nineteen—to be imprisoned than white men.4 The families and
communities of imprisoned Black Americans share each sentence, as the
incarceration of a parent or community member increases the risk of
food and housing insecurity for children and drains already limited
economic resources from the poorest Black communities, promoting
intergenerational criminal activity—a vicious cycle.5
1. HARRIET JACOBS, INCIDENTS IN THE LIFE OF A SLAVE GIRL 79 (1988).
2. See Katie Wedell et al., George Floyd Is Not Alone. ‘I Can’t Breathe’ Uttered by Dozens in
Fatal Police Holds Across U.S., USA TODAY (June 25, 2020, 8:58 AM),
https://www.usatoday.com/in-depth/news/investigations/2020/06/13/george-floyd-not-alonedozens-said-cant-breathe-police-holds/3137373001/ [https://perma.cc/ZMJ2-DERK] (detailing
fatal police encounters where victims said they could not breathe due to police restraint tactics).
3. Frank Edwards et al., Risk of Being Killed by Police Use of Force in the United States by
Age, Race-Ethnicity, and Sex, 116 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. 16793, 16794–95 (2019).
4. E. ANN CARSON, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., PRISONERS IN 2019, at 16
(Edrienne Su & Eric Hendrixson eds., 2020), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p19.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C97R-8AP8].
5. See, e.g., Joshua Kaiser, Revealing the Hidden Sentence: How to Add Transparency,
Legitimacy, and Purpose to “Collateral” Punishment Policy, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 123,
150–51 (2016) (discussing negative consequences incarcerated individuals’ children, families, and
communities face); Joseph E. Kennedy, The Jena Six, Mass Incarceration, and the Remoralization
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While a felony conviction may not lead to physical death, the
collateral consequences of a felony conviction often lead to civil death:
Today a criminal freed from prison has scarcely more rights, and
arguably less respect, than a freed slave or a black person living “free”
in Mississippi at the height of Jim Crow. Those released from prison on
parole can be stopped and searched by the police for any reason . . . and
returned to prison for the most minor of infractions, such as failing to
attend a meeting with a parole officer. . . . The “whites only” signs may
be gone, but new signs have gone up—notices placed in job
applications, rental agreements, loan applications, forms for welfare
benefits, school applications, and petitions for licenses, informing the
general public that “felons” are not wanted here. A criminal record
today authorizes precisely the forms of discrimination we supposedly
left behind—discrimination in employment, housing, education, public
benefits, and jury service. Those labeled criminals can even be denied
the right to vote.6

A felony conviction imposes significant social and economic barriers
on a person, making successful reentry to society extremely difficult and
a return to prison all but certain.7 These collateral consequences, like a
of Civil Rights, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 477, 486 (2009) (explaining how poor communities
are further weakened by increased poverty and crime due to mass incarceration of community
members); ANNIE E. CASEY FOUNDATION, A SHARED SENTENCE: THE DEVASTATING TOLL OF
INCARCERATION
ON
KIDS,
FAMILIES,
AND
COMMUNITIES
2–3
(2016),
https://www.aecf.org/m/resourcedoc/aecf-asharedsentence-2016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9GKXGAZH] (examining financial effects of parental incarceration on children and families, which
leads to food and housing insecurity); Eric Martin, Hidden Consequences: The Impact of
Incarceration on Dependent Children, NAT’L INST. JUST. J., May 2017, at 10, 12–14,
https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/250342.pdf [https://perma.cc/W3FW-X7PP] (noting that
children of incarcerated individuals “are, on average, six times more likely to become incarcerated
themselves” and are at substantial risk for other negative effects).
6. United States v. Nesbeth, 188 F. Supp. 3d 179, 182–83 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (quoting MICHELLE
ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW 141 (2010)). See also CHRISTOPHER UGGEN ET AL., THE
SENT’G PROJECT, LOCKED OUT 2020: ESTIMATES OF PEOPLE DENIED VOTING RIGHTS DUE TO A
FELONY
CONVICTION
4
(Oct.
30,
2020),
https://www.sentencingproject.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/10/Locked-Out-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/U9RZ-4NYU] (estimating one in
sixteen voting-age Black Americans is disenfranchised); Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil Death:
Rethinking Punishment in the Era of Mass Conviction, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1789, 1799–1801
(2012) (detailing a list of consequences convicted criminals face, resulting in the modern “civil
death”); Alec C. Ewald, “Civil Death”: The Ideological Paradox of Criminal Disenfranchisement
Law in the United States, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 1045, 1059–60, n.44 (providing historical context for
the concept of civil death).
7. See Mariel Alper et al., Bureau of Just. Stat., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Special Report: 2018
Update on Prisoner Recidivism: A 9-Year Follow-Up Period (2005-2014) 1 (Brigitte Coulton &
Jill
Thomas
eds.,
2018),
https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/18upr9yfup0514.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GA5L-VVBJ] (finding eighty-three percent of state prisoners released in 2005
across thirty states were arrested within nine years of their release from prison); Blair Ames, NIJFunded Research Examines What Works for Successful Reentry, Nat’l Inst. Just. J., November
2019, at 64, 64–65 https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/252721.pdf [https://perma.cc/2SU6-T7XX]
(examining the difficulties in producing successful reentry programs); Margaret E. Finzen, Systems
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criminal sentence, negatively impact a convicted felon’s family and
community.8
Disenfranchisement is especially damaging. An estimated 5.17 million
Americans have been disenfranchised due to felony conviction, a state
practice that affects one in sixteen Black Americans—“a rate 3.7 times
greater than that of non-African Americans.”9 The right to vote is central
to self-governance,10 the exercise of which promotes a sense of social,
economic, and political efficacy and of belonging to and having a stake
in a community.11 Studies support a positive correlation between voting
and reduced recidivism.12 Disenfranchisement, then, strips a convicted
felon of a primary source of successful reentry to society. It also
disempowers communities already marginalized and impoverished by
of Oppression: The Collateral Consequences of Incarceration and Their Effects on Black
Communities, 12 Geo. J. Poverty L. & Pol’y 299, 321 (2005) (noting compounding impacts of
collateral consequences on an individual that make avoiding recidivism nearly impossible).
8. See Finzen, supra note 7, at 321–22 (examining collateral consequences of individuals’
incarceration that ultimately affect the community); Darren Wheelock, Collateral Consequences
and Racial Inequality: Felon Status Restrictions as a System of Disadvantage, 21 J. CONTEMP.
CRIM. JUST. 82, 85 (2005) (noting implications for the economic well-being of ex-felons’ families
due to prohibition of service and aid to ex-felons).
9. UGGEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 4.
10.
[R]epresentative government is in essence self-government through the medium of
elected representatives of the people, and each and every citizen has an inalienable right
to full and effective participation in the political processes of his State’s legislative
bodies. Most citizens can achieve participation only as qualified voters through the
election of legislators to represent them. Full and effective participation by all its
citizens in state government requires, therefore, that each citizen have an equally
effective voice in the election of members of his state legislature.
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964).
11. See Christopher Uggen & Jeff Manza, Voting and Subsequent Crime and Arrest: Evidence
from a Community Sample, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 193, 198 (2004) (“[W]hen citizens
participate regularly in politics, they develop an explicit identification with the polity and its norms
and values. In this sense, democracy fosters citizenship.”); see also id. at 212 (“Those we
interviewed often spoke passionately about the stigma of a felony conviction and told us that
losing the right to vote, in particular, was a powerful symbol of their status as ‘outsiders.’”);
Steven E. Finkel, Reciprocal Effects of Participation and Political Efficacy: A Panel Analysis, 29
AM. J. POL. SCI. 891, 906–08 (1985) (revealing that participation in elections influences an
individual’s sense of external efficacy and a feeling of responsiveness from the political system).
12. See Guy Padraic Hamilton-Smith & Matt Vogel, The Violence of Voicelessness: The Impact
of Felony Disenfranchisement on Recidivism, 22 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 407, 413–14 (2012)
(noting that punishments like disenfranchisement lead ex-felons to feel undeserving of the benefits
and protections of the law and, thus, less likely to abide by it); see also Uggen & Manza, supra
note 11, at 214 (“[A] general education program working in concert with citizenship education and
political participation may be especially effective in facilitating desistence from crime.”); Aman
McLeod et al., The Locked Ballot Box: The Impact of State Criminal Disenfranchisement Law on
African American Voting Behavior and Implications for Reform, 11 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 66,
80–81 (2003) (suggesting a correlative relationship between disenfranchisement and decreased
voter turnout of non-disenfranchised).
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mass incarceration, creating “a culture of political nonparticipation that
discourages civic engagement and marginalizes the voices of community
members who remain engaged, but who are deprived of the collective
power of the votes of disenfranchised relatives and neighbors.” 13
Again, none of this is new; it is far too old. Black Americans’ claims
to full personhood, equal citizenship, and the franchise were hashed out
in the bloodiest war in United States history and through multiple
constitutional amendments, only to be stalled and sometimes thwarted
altogether by political processes that largely excluded them and by the
administration of justice itself. Well before emancipation, Frederick
Douglass rhetorically asked, “Are the great principles of political
freedom and of natural justice, embodied in that Declaration of
Independence, extended to us?”14 Nearly one hundred years after
emancipation, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. asked a similar rhetorical
question:
A law is unjust if it is inflicted on a minority that, as a result of being
denied the right to vote, had no part in enacting or devising the law. . . .
Throughout Alabama all sorts of devious methods are used to prevent
Negroes from becoming registered voters, and there are some counties
in which, even though Negroes constitute a majority of the population,
not a single Negro is registered. Can any law enacted under such
circumstances be considered democratically structured?15

Today—156 years after the Thirteenth Amendment was ratified, 153
years after the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, and 151 years after
the Fifteenth Amendment was ratified—Black Americans are routinely
subjected to “the only form of exclusion of adult, mentally competent
13. NAACP LEGAL DEF. AND EDUC. FUND & THE SENT’G PROJECT, FREE THE VOTE:
UNLOCKING DEMOCRACY IN THE CELLS AND ON THE STREETS 3 (2016),
https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Free-the-Vote.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R2EK-FNL8]. See also Mark Haase, Civil Death in Modern Times:
Reconsidering Felony Disenfranchisement in Minnesota, 99 MINN. L. REV. 1913, 1928–29 (2015)
(“[R]esearch suggests that children are more likely to vote as adults if they are raised by parents
who engage in the voting process. This means the negative effects of felony disenfranchisement on
public safety and racial disparities . . . will have a deeper and longer effect if maintained.”);
Hedwig Lee et al., Consequences of Family Member Incarceration: Impacts on Civic Participation
and Perceptions of the Legitimacy and Fairness of Government, 651 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. &
SOC. SCI. 44, 45 (2014) (“[T]he correctional system serves as a powerful institution for political
socialization for the families of those behind bars, influencing . . . their proclivity to vote and their
political attitudes.”).
14. Frederick Douglass, What to the Slave is the Fourth of July? (July 5, 1852), reprinted in
Dave Zirin, ‘What to the Slave Is the Fourth of July?’ by Frederick Douglass, THE NATION (July
4, 2012), https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/what-slave-fourth-july-frederick-douglass/
[https://perma.cc/6QK5-W5HE].
15. Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from Birmingham Jail, reprinted in ROBERT L. HAYMAN,
JR., NANCY LEVIT & RICHARD DELGADO, JURISPRUDENCE CLASSICAL AND CONTEMPORARY:
FROM NATURAL LAW TO POSTMODERNISM 50 (2d ed. West 2002) (emphasis added).

2021]

The Slavery Clause and Criminal Disenfranchisement

95

citizens from equal citizenship”: criminal disenfranchisement.16
Criminal disenfranchisement today seems an anomaly in the United
States, a country that considers the right to vote a “fundamental political
right,” the infringement of which “must be carefully and meticulously
scrutinized.”17 Yet, despite legal challenges and public criticism, the
practice persists. In Richardson v. Ramirez, the United States Supreme
Court held lifetime felony disenfranchisement laws do not violate the
Equal Protection Clause, reasoning that criminal disenfranchisement
finds affirmative sanction in Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment.18
The Richardson opinion imposed a near-insurmountable hurdle19 to
criminal-disenfranchisement challenges, as courts continue to point to
Richardson in affirming the practice against First Amendment,20 Eighth
Amendment,21 and Voting Rights Act challenges.22
Most criminal-disenfranchisement scholarship in the United States
16. Milena Tripković, Punishment and Citizenship: A Theory of Criminal Disenfranchisement
1 (2019).
17. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964). See also Pamela S. Karlan, Convictions and
Doubts: Retribution, Representation, and the Debate over Felon Disenfranchisement, 56 STAN. L.
REV. 1147, 1151–52 (2004) (“In subsequent cases, the Court has held that because voting is a
‘fundamental’ right, laws that deny citizens the right to vote must be ‘necessary to promote a
compelling’—and not merely a legitimate—‘state interest.’” (first quoting Kramer v. Union Free
Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969); then quoting Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336
(1972) (emphasis omitted))).
18. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54–55 (1974). See generally U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 2 (“But when the right to vote at any election . . . is denied to any of the male inhabitants of
such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way
abridged, except for participation in rebellion or other crime, the basis of representation therein
shall be reduced in proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole
number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.”).
19. The Richardson opinion did not foreclose equal protection challenges to criminal
disenfranchisement laws where evidence demonstrates discriminatory intent in enacting a
disenfranchisement provision. See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 229 (1985) (holding
Alabama misdemeanor disenfranchisement law unconstitutional based on evidence the state
enacted the law “with the intent of disenfranchising [B]lacks”).
20. See e.g., Hand v. Scott, 888 F.3d 1206, 1212–13 (11th Cir. 2018) (citing Richardson in
emphasizing that the Supreme Court has suggested disenfranchisement of convicted felons does
not violate the First Amendment).
21. See e.g., Thompson v. Merrill, 505 F. Supp. 3d 1239, 1266–67 (M.D. Ala. 2020) (citing
Richardson and refusing to find that the Fourteenth Amendment allows disenfranchisement of
felons while the Eighth Amendment prohibits it); El-Amin v. McDonnell, No. 3:12-cv-00538JAG, 2013 WL 1193357, at *7 (E.D. Va. Mar. 22, 2013) (citing Richardson and holding,
consistently with the consensus throughout the country, that felon disenfranchisement does not
violate the Eighth Amendment).
22. See e.g., Simmons v. Galvin, 575 F.3d 24, 32 (1st Cir. 2009) (emphasizing the Supreme
Court’s continued reliance on Richardson supporting “the state’s denial of the right to vote to
felons has constitutional grounding”); Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1228–29 (11th
Cir. 2005) (citing Richardson and declining to interpret Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act to
apply to felony disenfranchisement laws).
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takes as given that the practice is one way or another illegitimate—e.g.,
the practice is outdated and incompatible with equal citizenship, or the
practice lacks constitutional sanction, notwithstanding the Richardson
interpretation. So far, criminal-disenfranchisement abolition has
generated little traction in the legal system. In an effort to generate some
traction, this article takes a different approach.
This article argues that the Thirteenth Amendment informs the debate
over the (il)legitimacy of state felony-disenfranchisement practices, with
particular emphasis placed on the amendment’s exception. The
Thirteenth Amendment states, “Neither slavery nor involuntary
servitude, except as punishment for crime whereof the party shall have
been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place
subject to their jurisdiction.”23 The first section of this article provides an
overview of Richardson and some challenges to felony
disenfranchisement to contextualize the discussion. The second section
examines the legislative and judicial treatment of the Thirteenth
Amendment’s exception in an effort to glean its meaning. The third
section provides a reading of the Thirteenth Amendment’s exception that
accords with the unity of purpose underlying the Reconstruction
amendments. Lastly, the fourth section articulates the ways in which the
Thirteenth Amendment informs the felony-disenfranchisement debate.
I. THE CRIMINAL-DISENFRANCHISEMENT CONTROVERSY
The Richardson decision directly or indirectly raises three issues in
the felony disenfranchisement debate:
(1) the strength of the relationship between citizenship and the right to
vote,
(2) the degree to which felony disenfranchisement constitutes
punishment, and
(3) the legitimacy of the state interests at stake.
This section provides an overview of the primary arguments and
concerns that underlie these three issues, with some additional
commentary, to set the groundwork for the discussion below as to how
the Thirteenth Amendment bears on them.
A. Does Citizenship Include the Unconditional Right to Vote?
The United States Constitution initially said little to nothing about
who gets to vote. Neither the original Constitution nor the Bill of Rights
expressly secured the right to vote.24 Section 2 of the Fourteenth
23. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 (emphasis added).
24. The Constitution left to the states the right to determine voter qualifications in federal
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Amendment marked the first time the Constitution said anything about a
“right to vote,” though without expressly securing such right.25 The
Fourteenth Amendment also marked the first time the Constitution
defined citizenship, and Section 2’s reference to “the right to vote” was,
in part, tied to citizenship. Every voting-rights-related constitutional
amendment thereafter expressly referenced “[t]he right of Citizens of the
United States to vote” as a preface to what a state could not consider as a
(dis)qualifying factor in determining citizens’ voter eligibility.26 Over
the course of 103 years—from the time the Fourteenth Amendment was
ratified in 1868 to the time the Twenty-Sixth Amendment was ratified in
1971—and five constitutional amendments, the Constitution tied the
“right to vote” to citizenship but never once expressly secured to all
adult, mentally competent citizens an unconditional right to vote.
Today, the right to vote is considered a fundamental feature of
citizenship in the United States and in all contemporary democracies.
Unsurprisingly, then, a central debate over the legitimacy of criminal
disenfranchisement laws centers on the following normative question: Is
the right to vote an unconditional feature of citizenship? If it is
unconditional, then felony disenfranchisement is an illegitimate state
practice. If it is conditional, then the right to vote no longer looks like a
“fundamental matter,” and if that right is a feature of citizenship, then
“citizenship” appears, at least conceptually, unstable. A new question
arises: under what conditions may a state legitimately burden the
citizenship status of its members, such that members might, at times, not
share or enjoy equal citizenship status? The Supreme Court indirectly
elections for members of the House of Representatives: “The House of Representatives shall be
composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States, and the
Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous
Branch of the State Legislature.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1. The people did not directly elect
United States Senators until after the Seventeenth Amendment was ratified in 1913, and even the
Seventeenth Amendment left to the states the right to determine voter qualifications. See U.S.
CONST. amend. XVII (“The electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for
electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures.”). The United States President was
then and is still now elected by electors appointed by each state; that is, the people do not directly
elect the President. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3 (“The Electors shall meet in their respective
States, and vote by Ballot for two Persons . . . The Person having the greatest Number of Votes
shall be the President . . . .”).
25. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
26. Emphasis added. The Fifteenth Amendment does not allow “race, color, or previous
condition of servitude” to serve as a ground for the state to disenfranchise a citizen. U.S. CONST.
amend. XV, § 1. The Nineteenth Amendment, similarly, does not allow gender or “sex” to serve as
a ground for voter disqualification. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX. The Twenty-Fourth Amendment
prohibits states from denying citizens the right to vote due to inability or failure to pay any tax.
U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § 1. The Twenty-Sixth Amendment does not allow states to
disenfranchise a citizen on account of his or her age, unless the citizen is younger than eighteen
years. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI § 1.
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addressed the question of unequal citizenship raised by criminaldisenfranchisement practices, but its answer in Richardson v. Ramirez
inspired significantly more criticism than confidence.
Richardson came to the Court by Writ of Certiorari filed by a
California county clerk who sought reversal of the California Supreme
Court’s declaratory judgment that the state’s felony-disenfranchisement
law violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. The
California Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny to the state’s franchise
restriction, pointing to the United States Supreme Court’s more recent
voting rights cases, namely Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,27
Kramer v. Union School District,28 Bullock v. Carter,29 and Dunn v.
Blumstein.30 These post-Reynold v. Sims cases applied strict scrutiny to
voting-right restrictions because, “[b]y denying some citizens the right to
vote, such laws deprive them of ‘a fundamental political right, . . .
preservative of all rights.’”31 The California Supreme Court held that
disenfranchising ex-felons who had completed their sentence was not the
least restrictive means necessary to promote the state’s interest in
preventing election fraud: “[T]he enforcement of modern statutes
regulating the voting process and penalizing its misuse . . . is today the
method of preventing election fraud which is the least burdensome on
the right of suffrage.”32
A majority in Richardson v. Ramirez held otherwise—that lifetime
felony disenfranchisement bans do not by their function alone violate the
equal protection clause. To support its holding, the Court reasoned that
Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides express textual support
for state-enacted felony disenfranchisement laws.33 Section 2 punished
states by reducing the congressional representation of any state that

27. See generally Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666–70 (1966) (applying strict
scrutiny and holding poll tax unconstitutional).
28. See Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 626–30 (1969) (applying strict
scrutiny to and invalidating state statute limiting right to vote for rural and suburban district school
board members to parents of a child enrolled in a school in the district or to those who owned or
leased, or who were married to one who owned or leased, taxable real property in the district).
29. See Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 144 (1971) (applying strict scrutiny to electoral
candidate filing fee law because, although not directly restricting right to vote, the fee at issue
priced out potential candidates from poorer communities, substantially limiting the opportunities of
less affluent voters to vote for candidates of their own choosing).
30. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342–60 (1972) (applying strict scrutiny to and
invalidating state statute restricting right to vote for in-state candidates to one year residency in the
state).
31. Id. at 336 (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964)).
32. Ramirez v. Brown, 507 P.2d 1345, 1357 (Cal. 1973), rev’d sub nom. Richardson v.
Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974).
33. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 54–55.
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denied the right to vote of any “male” who was “twenty-one years of
age” and a United States citizen, except for “participation in rebellion, or
other crime.”34 As the majority in Richardson viewed the matter,
Congress could not have intended to bar criminal disenfranchisement via
Section 1’s Equal Protection Clause when Congress expressly exempted
criminal disenfranchisement from Section 2’s “less drastic sanction of
reduced representation.”35
The majority in Richardson also looked to legislative history to glean
Congress’ purpose in including the exception to Section 2. From the time
Senator George H. Williams of Oregon proposed language for Section 2,
the exception at issue remained unaltered. A few members of Congress
acknowledged the exception to crime in discussing Section 2’s
purpose—to ensure equal representation among states.36 The Court
quoted a comment by Ohio Representative Ephraim R. Eckley, which the
Court viewed as providing some explanation for the “other crimes”
component of the exception:
Under a congressional act persons convicted of a crime against the laws
of the United States, the penalty for which is imprisonment in the
penitentiary, are now and always have been disenfranchised, and a
pardon did not restore them unless the warrant of pardon so provided.
. . . But suppose the mass of the people of a State are pirates,
counterfeiters, or other criminals, would gentlemen be willing to repeal
the laws now in force in order to give them an opportunity to land their
piratical crafts and come on shore to assist in the election of a President
or members of Congress because they are numerous? And let it be
borne in mind that these latter offenses are only crimes committed
against property; that of treason is against the nation, against the whole
people—the highest known to the law.37

The majority took this legislative history to provide support for its
holding that Section 2 provides an “affirmative sanction” for “the
exclusion of felons from the vote.”38
The dissent in Richardson argued that Section 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment did not limit Section 1’s Equal Protection Clause or Due
Process Clause as a means to remedy electoral discrimination practices,
including felony disenfranchisement:
The Court’s references to congressional enactments contemporaneous
to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . are inapposite. They
do not explain the purpose for the adoption of [Section 2] of the
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (emphasis added).
Richardson, 418 U.S. at 55.
Id. at 45–46 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 2543 (1866)).
Id. at 46 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 2435 (1866)).
Id. at 54.
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Fourteenth Amendment. They merely indicate that disenfranchisement
for participation in crime was not uncommon in the States at the time
of the adoption of the Amendment. Hence, not surprisingly, that form
of disenfranchisement was excepted from the application of the special
penalty provision of [Section 2]. But because Congress chose to
exempt one form of electoral discrimination from the reduction-ofrepresentation remedy provided by [Section 2] does not necessarily
imply congressional approval of this disenfranchisement. . . . There is
no basis for concluding that Congress intended by [Section 2] to freeze
the meaning of other clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
conception of voting rights prevalent at the time of the adoption of the
Amendment.39

Justice Marshall rebuked blanket disenfranchisement of ex-felons,
noting the practice “had ‘its origin in the fogs and fictions of feudal
jurisprudence and doubtless has been brought forward into modern
statutes without fully realizing either the effect of its literal significance
or the extent of its infringement upon the spirit of our system of
government.’”40
Justice Marshall included in his dissent the importance of voting rights
to equal citizenship. The Court’s voting-rights precedent “made clear
that a citizen has a constitutionally protected right to participate in
elections on an equal basis with other citizens in the jurisdiction.”41
Strict scrutiny applies whenever a statute “grants the right to vote to
some citizens and denies the franchise to others . . . .” 42 Once an offender
serves her time and pays her debt to society, the dissent reasoned, she
has a right to participate in “governmental decision-making,” as her life
is as affected and she possesses as strong an interest as every other
citizen in government decisions.43 Disenfranchisement hinders a polity’s
efforts “to rehabilitate former felons and convert them into law-abiding
and productive citizens.”44
The Richardson opinion received, and continues to receive, much
criticism for its reliance on and interpretation of Section 2 to hold felony
disenfranchisement constitutional. The general consensus among
scholars critical or skeptical of the holding in Richardson is that Section
2 of the Fourteenth Amendment lacks explanatory power to support

39. Id. at 75–76 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
40. Id. at 85–86 (quoting Byers v. Sun Sav. Bank, 139 P. 948, 949 (Okla. 1914)).
41. Id. at 77 (quoting Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972)).
42. Id. at 78 (quoting Dunn, 405 U.S. at 337).
43. Id. at 79 (quoting Memorandum of the Secretary of State of California in Opposition to
Certiorari, Class of County Clerks and Registrars of Voters of California v. Ramirez, No. 73-324).
44. Id.

2021]

The Slavery Clause and Criminal Disenfranchisement

101

blanket felony disenfranchisement for any duration whatsoever.45
Something more is necessary to justify “the harshest civil sanction
imposed by a democratic society,” in which “the disenfranchised is
severed from the body politic and condemned to the lowest form of
citizenship . . . .”46
There is a palpable connection between citizenship and the right to
vote. Citizens expect equal political participation, an expectation
exemplified by American citizens’ unceasing efforts to secure the
franchise. They consider their claim to equal franchise rights legitimate,
as legitimate as government’s expectation that citizens observe the
correlative obligations that stem from the rights of citizenship.47 It is
likely no mistake that, as Pamela Karlan observes, “virtually every major
expansion in the right to vote was connected intimately to war.”48 From
the poor among the militiamen in 1776, to the women who secured the
45. See David J. Zeitlin, Note, Revisiting Richardson v. Ramirez: The Constitutional Bounds of
Ex-Felon Disenfranchisement, 70 ALA. L. REV. 259, 281–85 (2019) (arguing that the original
public meaning of “other crimes” in the disenfranchisement context, gleaned from state laws in
place when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, limited the practice to “crimes constituting
betrayals of the public trust as well as the most serious felonies,” not, as Richardson suggests,
extending to any felony whatsoever); see also John Hart Ely, Interclausal Immunity, 87 VA. L.
REV. 1185, 1195 (2001) (contending that the Richardson Court placed undue weight on states’
felony disenfranchisement practices when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, although
Section 2’s plain language does not deem the practice unconstitutional); Gabriel J. Chin,
Reconstruction, Felon Disenfranchisement, and the Right to Vote: Did the Fifteenth Amendment
Repeal Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment?, 92 GEO. L.J. 259, 275–78, 313–15 (2004)
(asserting the Richardson Court incorrectly relied on Section 2 for an express grant to
disenfranchise a person for a criminal conviction because the Fifteenth Amendment impliedly
repealed Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment); David L. Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist: A
Preliminary View, 90 HARV. L. REV. 293, 303–04 (1976) (contending the Fourteenth Amendment
lacks any express statement suggesting the Equal Protection Clause does not apply in voting-rights
cases, even those considering felony disenfranchisement, and the legislative history of the
amendment reveals no such restriction.); cf. Richard M. Re & Christopher M. Re, Voting and Vice:
Criminal Disenfranchisement and the Reconstruction Amendments, 121 YALE L.J. 1584, 1649–55
(2012) (examining possible drafting approaches Congress may have taken had it intended to limit
Section 2’s scope).
46. McLaughlin v. City of Canton, 947 F. Supp. 954, 971 (S.D. Miss. 1995).
47. See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 159–60 (1963) (“Citizenship is a most
precious right. It is expressly guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution . . . .
The Constitution is silent about the permissibility of involuntary forfeiture of citizenship rights.
While it confirms citizenship rights, plainly there are imperative obligations of citizenship . . . .
One of the most important of these is to serve the country in time of war and national
emergency.”); see also Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717, 736 (1952) (“An American
citizen owes allegiance to the United States wherever he may reside.”); United States v. Wong
Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 694–96, 704–05 (1898) (applying the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Citizenship Clause to establish that naturalized citizens are entitled to protections of and
allegiances to the United States so long as the naturalized citizens’ parents were not employed in
any official capacity by a foreign country).
48. Pamela S. Karlan, Ballots and Bullets: The Exceptional History of the Right to Vote, 71 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1345, 1346 (2003).
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home front by entering the labor force during World War I, to the
sacrifices made by eighteen-year-olds fighting in Vietnam, voting rights
were expanded under the recognition that it is unjust to require citizens
to sacrifice their lives and their livelihoods when they are excluded from
the decision-making process.49
Equally telling here, every voting rights amendment following the
Fourteenth Amendment starts with “The Right of Citizens of the United
States to vote.” The priority in words is paramount. Notice that Section 2
of the Fourteenth Amendment—the first time “the right to vote” made its
way into the Constitution—places “the right to vote” well before its
reference to citizenship, the reference of which is just one among other
qualifiers (age and gender) that invoke Section 2’s sanction; in other
words, the “right to vote” and citizenship are untethered in Section 2 of
the Fourteenth Amendment, with citizenship playing a contingent role
like age and gender. Unlike Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Fifteenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-Fourth, and Twenty-Sixth Amendments
intimately link the right to vote and citizenship.
Yet the strength of the connection between citizenship and the
franchise, and the circumstances that must be met in order legitimately to
sever that connection, remain unclear in the United States. This
uncertainty is strange, considering the right to citizenship is absolute and
the Supreme Court has construed the right to vote as fundamental to
citizenship. Every citizen possesses a “constitutional right to remain a
citizen . . . unless he voluntarily relinquishes that citizenship.”50 In
pronouncing citizens’ absolute right to citizenship, the Court in Afroyim
v. Rusk reasoned that “the people are sovereign and the Government
cannot sever its relationship to the people by taking away their
citizenship.”51 The Afroyim Court added:
Citizenship in this Nation is a part of a cooperative affair. Its citizenry
is the country and the country is its citizenry. The very nature of our
free government makes it completely incongruous to have a rule of law
under which a group of citizens temporarily in office can deprive
another group of citizens of their citizenship.52

If a fundamental connection between citizenship and the franchise
exists in the United States, then should not Afroyim’s reasoning—that
when a group of citizens temporarily in office temporarily or
permanently disenfranchise another group of citizens, depriving them,
49. See id. at 1346–59 (discussing examples throughout United States history where voting
rights were quickly expanded due to war and the great sacrifice of life that wars require).
50. Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 268 (1967).
51. Id. at 257.
52. Id. at 268.
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that is, of the right preservative of all rights—caution greater scrutiny
than the rational basis analysis applied by Richardson?
Richardson did not expressly consider the strength of the connection
between citizenship and the right to vote. The holding in Richardson,
nevertheless, stands for the proposition that a criminal conviction is
sufficient to permanently sever any connection between citizenship and
the franchise. This missing consideration calls into question the validity
of the Court’s reasoning and, thereby, its holding.53
Yet it is not enough to simply point out that Richardson rested on poor
reasoning or employed the wrong analysis. Some normative account
must be given of the right to vote as either a conditional or unconditional
feature of citizenship to lend explanatory power to policy decisions one
way or another on the issue. As Milena Tripković observes, criminaldisenfranchisement scholarship often focuses more on countering
arguments that purportedly justify the practice than on constructing a
comprehensive theoretical framework that uncovers “the core of the
relationship between criminal offending and franchise restrictions.”54
Tripković’s normative account will be discussed below, but here it is
important to note her account centers on citizenship not only as a passive
status, but also as an active relationship between a citizen and a given
polity.55 She provides an empirical account of criminal
disenfranchisement in European countries and compares them to the
practice among states in the United States. The comparison demonstrates
that it is widespread in both places, the difference being only a matter of
degree: criminal disenfranchisement practices in the United States are
harsher in degree than the practice in most European countries.56 The
prevalence of criminal disenfranchisement among democratic countries,
she argues, “proves that one cannot hold to one’s citizenship status
unconditionally.”57 She explains “[t]he interpretation of electoral
restrictions in the case of criminal disenfranchisement seems to suggest
53. See, e.g., Zeitlin, supra note 45, 285–92 (arguing the right to vote is a fundamental right of
citizenship, which requires a court to apply strict scrutiny to laws that disenfranchise anyone who
is a full member of society, ex-felons included); Developments in the Law—The Law of Prisons:
One Person, No Vote: The Laws of Felon Disenfranchisement, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1939, 1940–41
(2002) [hereinafter One Person, No Vote] (arguing existing justifications for felony
disenfranchisement laws, such as civic republicanism and breach of the social contract, lack
explanatory power to support the notion that criminal offenders lack the necessary qualities for
membership in a given polity).
54. TRIPKOVIĆ, supra note 16, at 10–11.
55. See id. at 70. (“Yet, this interpretation obscures the fact that citizenship not only has a
passive component (the status of belonging and the rights consequently accorded), but that it also
designates an active relationship between a citizen and the political community.”).
56. Id. at 44–45.
57. Id. at 71.
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that some conditions for membership cease to be fulfilled, which
presumably justifies the loss of electoral rights and thus alters the
citizenship status (in this sense, citizenship requirements become
citizenship conditions).”58
Although Tripković’s theoretical account is not specifically a critique
of criminal disenfranchisement laws in the United States, rather a general
account of the practice in democratic nations, mainly in Europe, her
work may help refocus the criminal-disenfranchisement debate in the
United States from one primarily centered on “equal protection of the
laws” to one focused on the nature and scope of “citizenship,” the latter
of which appears to be the real concern at issue.
B. Does Criminal Disenfranchisement Constitute Punishment?
Another issue criminal disenfranchisement raises is whether the
practice constitutes punishment or something else. While states
traditionally enjoyed wide latitude to regulate ballot-box access, the
United States Constitution constrained state power to impose
punishment, especially after the requisite states ratified the Fourteenth
Amendment. Abolitionists argue that criminal disenfranchisement
constitutes punishment, which invokes the full panoply of constitutional
protections afforded criminal defendants, including individuated due
process and protection against cruel and unusual punishment.59
The Court in Richardson did not directly address this issue. However,
Richardson pointed to three prior opinions to support its holding:
Murphy v. Ramsey,60 Davis v. Beason,61 and Lassiter v. Northampton
58. Id.
59. See Amy Heath, Comment, Cruel and Unusual Punishment: Denying Ex-Felons the Right
to Vote After Serving Their Sentences, 25 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 327, 335–37, 346–
54 (2017) (discussing that courts often mistakenly consider disenfranchisement statutes compliant
with the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual punishment clause while felons are often barred
from voting years after their time has been served, which should be held a violation of the Eighth
Amendment); see also Gabriel J. Chin, The “Voting Rights Act of 1867”: The Constitutionality of
Federal Regulation of Suffrage During Reconstruction, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1581, 1588 (2004) (“[I]n
spite of the protection of the franchise under the Fourteenth Amendment and the Voting Rights Act
of 1965, enforcement of the Reconstruction Acts would affect the scope of the right to vote . . . .”);
Karlan, supra note 17, at 1150–55, 1164–69 (arguing that the former assumption that criminal
disenfranchisement is regulatory in nature, rather than punitive, is no longer valid so criminal
disenfranchisement must be “justified as an appropriate punishment”); Mark E. Thompson, Don’t
Do the Crime if You Ever Intend to Vote Again: Challenging the Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons
as Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 167, 186–204 (2002) (examining
various nonpenal purposes that have been argued in support of criminal disenfranchisement as
regulatory in nature).
60. See Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 42–44 (1885) (upholding a federal law banning
polygamists from voting).
61. See Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 348 (1890) (affirming a lower court’s decision
upholding a state law that required an oath that a voter was neither bigamist nor polygamist).
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County Board of Elections.62 These cases approved legislative plenary
power to regulate voter qualifications.
Murphy affirmed Congress’ power by federal statute to regulate the
franchise in the territories over which it possessed exclusive jurisdiction
and upheld the disenfranchisement of “polygamist, bigamist, or any
person cohabitating with more than one woman” in the territory of
Utah.63 Disenfranchisement under the statute required no criminal
conviction.64 In the Court’s opinion, the legislature possessed broad
plenary power over voter qualifications:
It is precisely similar to an inquiry into the fact of nativity, of age, or of
any other status made necessary by law as a condition of the elective
franchise. It would be quite competent for the sovereign power to
declare that no one but a married person shall be entitled to vote; and in
that event the election officers would be authorized to determine for
that occasion, in case of question in any instance, upon the fact of
marriage as a continuing status. There is no greater objection, in point
of law, to a similar inquiry for the like purpose into the fact of a
subsisting and continuing bigamous or polygamous relation, when it is
made, as by the statute under consideration, a disqualification to vote.65

The Court noted the disenfranchisement provision at issue was not
crime based, as it reached any person in a bigamous or polygamous
relationship; thus, disenfranchisement did not constitute punishment or
penalty for any crime.66
Davis involved a writ of habeas corpus filed by a defendant who
challenged an Idaho court’s jurisdiction over a charge that he conspired
falsely to procure registration to vote in the territory.67 The defendant
and other members of the Mormon Church sought to register to vote and
took the requisite oath before various precinct registrars, affirming, as
Idaho law required, that they were not members of an organization that
taught or practiced bigamy or polygamy as a duty or rite of the
organization.68 The defendant argued the United States preempted any
territorial law that imposed bigamy- or polygamy-related criminal
punishment.69 The Court held Idaho possessed jurisdiction over the

62. Lassiter v. Northampton Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 50–51 (1959) (upholding a
state requirement that all voters pass a literacy test).
63. Murphy, 114 U.S. at 38, 44–45.
64. Id. at 42–44.
65. Id. at 43–44.
66. Id. at 42–43.
67. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 334–37 (1890).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 337–41.
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charge.70 In reaching its holding, the Court noted the statute was “not
open to any constitutional or legal objection,” as it simply excluded from
“the privilege of voting” any person who practiced or advocated bigamy
or polygamy.71
The Richardson Court referenced Lassiter for the proposition that
“previous criminal record” provides an example—like age, and
residence—“indicating factors which a State may take into consideration
in determining the qualifications of voters.”72 Lassiter held literacy tests
were not per se unconstitutional prerequisites to exercise the right to
vote. As the Court viewed the matter,
Literacy and illiteracy are neutral on race, creed, color, and sex, as
reports around the world show. Literacy and intelligence are obviously
not synonymous. Illiterate people may be intelligent voters. Yet in our
society where newspapers, periodicals, books, and other printed matter
canvass and debate campaign issues, a State might conclude that only
those who are literate should exercise the franchise. . . . North Carolina
agrees. We do not sit in judgment on the wisdom of that policy. 73

The Court’s opinion did not reach any literacy test intended or
employed to discriminate on the basis of race, creed, color, or sex.74
The distinction between criminal disenfranchisement practices as
punishment versus nonpenal regulation arose in Trop v. Dulles,75 a case
that, like Richardson, cited Murphy and Davis for support. In Dulles, the
Court considered penal in its purpose a statute that “imposes a disability”
to punish (“to reprimand the wrongdoer, to deter others, etc.”), but
considered nonpenal a statute aiming to accomplish a legitimate
government purpose other than punishment.76 In some instances,
according to Dulles, a statutory disability may have penal and nonpenal
effects, in which case courts must look to the “evident purpose of the
legislature.”77 The Court provided the following example:
A person who commits a bank robbery, for instance, loses his right to
liberty and often his right to vote. If, in the exercise of the power to
protect banks, both sanctions were imposed for the purpose of
punishing bank robbers, the statutes authorizing both disabilities would
be penal. But because the purpose of the latter statute is to designate a

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 345–46.
Id. at 347.
Lassiter v. Northampton Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 51–52 (1959).
Id. at 51–53.
Id. at 53.
See generally Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (plurality opinion).
Id. at 96.
Id.
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reasonable ground of eligibility for voting, this law is sustained as a
nonpenal exercise of the power to regulate the franchise.78

The Court did not specify a legitimate legislative purpose served by
criminal disenfranchisement.79 However, the case demonstrates that, if a
court determines the statute is penal in nature, the Eighth Amendment’s
cruel and unusual punishment prohibition may apply.80
Many scholars argue criminal disenfranchisement, especially lifetime
disenfranchisement, amounts to punishment. The arguments typically
attack the traditional notion that legislatures enjoy deferential plenary
power over voting rights and the notion that criminal disenfranchisement
serves a legitimate, nonpenal purpose.81 Arguments against unfettered
plenary power will be addressed here.82
With respect to legislative plenary power, Pamela S. Karlan points out
the three cases cited with approval by the Richardson Court would likely
not survive constitutional scrutiny today.83 Murphy, Davis, and Lassiter
all predate the Supreme Court’s shift in voting-rights jurisprudence to
treating voting rights as fundamental, thereby calling into question the
continued validity of those cases.84 Also, the Court in Romer v. Evans
expressly announced that, to the extent Davis held a state may
disenfranchise groups because of their status, “its ruling could not stand
without surviving strict scrutiny, a most doubtful outcome.”85 Thus,
current voting-rights jurisprudence undermines the plenary-power
deference courts previously conferred on legislatures and, thereby, calls
into question the nonpenal purposes of criminal disenfranchisement.
Plenary power to impose criminal disenfranchisement as a regulatory
sanction also rests on uncertain and ill-defined grounds. Discussing the
Dulles opinion, Karlan notes the Court “never explained why eligibility
78. Id. at 96–97.
79. See Karlan, supra note 17, at 1150–51 (“He never explained why eligibility to vote should
turn on one’s not having robbed a bank. Instead, he simply relied on two nineteenth-century
decisions—Davis v. Beason and Murphy v. Ramsey—in which the Court had upheld the denial of
voting rights to polygamists as a simple regulation of the franchise.”).
80. Trop, 356 U.S. at 99.
81. This section focuses primarily on the arguments against any nonpenal purposes legislatures
or courts advanced in denying ex-felons the right to vote. It does not delve in detail into the
specific nonpenal purposes legislatures or courts raised to support criminal disenfranchisement, a
discussion reserved for the next section.
82. The next section discusses the various purposes advanced to support criminal
disenfranchisement and responses thereto.
83. See Karlan, supra note 17, at 1151–53 (explaining that Murphy, Davis, and Lassiter likely
would not survive constitutional scrutiny today).
84. Id.
85. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634–35 (1996); see also Karlan, supra note 17, at 1151–52
(explaining that Davis likely would not survive strict scrutiny today).
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to vote should turn on one’s not having robbed a bank,” but simply relied
on Murphy and Beason—two cases that assumed unfettered legislative
power to regulate ballot-box access.86 Dulles’ bank robber example begs
the question the Court raised in distinguishing between nonpenal and
penal purposes that underwrite a statutory disability. That is, whether
disenfranchisement is crime-based or status-based, the disability stems
from the same source (legislative power) and has the same result, or, as
the Court put it, “effect”: disenfranchisement. Nora V. Demleitner makes
a similar observation, charging that the plurality’s argument in Dulles
lacked “explanatory power in light of its finding that denationalization is
a penal sanction,”87 considering denationalization stemmed from
Congress’ power to regulate citizenship under the Nationality Act of
1940, an Act that expatriated any person convicted of desertion by a
military tribunal under the Articles of War.88
Further undercutting Dulles’ penal/nonpenal distinction, legislatures
and courts have not uniformly treated or referred to criminal
disenfranchisement as nonpenal.89 Some courts have referred to criminal
disenfranchisement as a civil sanction.90 Others have referred to it as
punishment.91 State statutes typically do not specify whether criminal
86. See Karlan, supra note 17, at 1150–52, 1150 n.11 (“Chief Justice Warren identified no
particular legitimate, nonpenal purposes served by disenfranchising offenders . . . .”).
87. Nora V. Demleitner, Continuing Payment on One’s Debt to Society: The German Model of
Felon Disenfranchisement As an Alternative, 84 MINN. L. REV. 753, 783–84 (2000). See also
Karlan, supra note 17, at 1150 n.11 (“Ironically, the Chief Justice made this observation in the
course of distinguishing laws that strip individuals of their citizenship, which the Court held were
not only punitive, but so punitive as to violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and
unusual punishments.”).
88. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 123–24 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
89. See Demleitner, supra note 87, at 784 (explaining that courts differed in holding
disenfranchisement as either a civil sanction or criminal punishment); see also Karlan, supra note
17, at 1154 (discussing how the Richardson Court treated criminal disenfranchisement as
nonpunitive while some post-Civil War Congresses treated disenfranchisement as an aspect of
punishment).
90. See, e.g., Shepherd v. Trevino, 575 F.2d 1110, 1115 (5th Cir. 1978) (“The Texas system of
disenfranchising and reenfranchising convicted felons gives the state courts the power to set aside
these convictions and to restore the civil rights of successful state probationers.”); Green v. Bd. of
Elections of N.Y., 380 F.2d 445, 450 (2d Cir. 1967) (citing Trop, 356 U.S. at 97) (noting
disenfranchisement as a nonpenal sanction); Perry-Bey v. Holder, No. 2:14-cv-359, 2015 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 115737, at *10 (E.D. Va. Mar. 24, 2015), aff’d by Green v. Lynch, 613 Fed. App’x
218 (4th Cir. 2015) (noting criminal disenfranchisement as a civil sanction).
91. See, e.g., Thompson v. Merrill, 505 F. Supp. 3d 1239, 1262 (M.D. Ala. 2020), appeal
docketed, No. 21-10034 (Jan. 5, 2021) (explaining disenfranchisement is punishment); Jones v.
Governor of Fla. (Jones II), 975 F.3d 1016, 1029–32 (11th Cir. 2020) (concluding
disenfranchisement statutes are punishment); Jones v. Governor of Fla. (Jones I), 950 F.3d 795,
810 (11th Cir. 2020) (finding Florida’s felony disenfranchisement provision constitutes
punishment); Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1228 (11th Cir. 2005) (“Felon
disenfranchisement laws are unlike other voting qualifications. These laws are deeply rooted in this
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disenfranchisement constitutes punishment. However, Gabriel J. Chin
notes, pursuant to the Military Reconstruction Act of 1867, all southern
states seeking readmission to the Union extended the right to vote to all
men regardless of race, “except as a punishment for such crimes as are
now felonies at common law, whereof they shall have been duly
convicted.”92 The historical precedent set by states under the
Reconstruction Act of 1867, according to Chin, supports the view that
criminal disenfranchisement constitutes punishment.93
This debate over the nature of criminal disenfranchisement was
revitalized following the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Jones v.
Governor of Florida (Jones II),94 a much-anticipated decision leading up
to the 2020 election. The court in Jones II held that Florida’s reenfranchisement provision, which requires a person convicted of a felony
to complete her sentence, including paying any sentence-imposed fines,
fees, costs, or restitution, to regain the right to vote, did not violate the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause and did not constitute
a prohibitive voting tax in violation of the Twenty-Fourth Amendment.95
The Jones II court did not directly address whether criminal
disenfranchisement constituted punishment or something else, though the
Jones I court did: “Disenfranchisement is punishment.”96
But Jones II made inconsistent statements respecting the nature of
criminal disenfranchisement. The court used nonpenal language on the
one hand—“requiring felons to complete their sentences is directly
related to voting qualifications because imprisonment and parole are
imposed as punishment for the crimes by which felons forfeited their
right to vote”—and penal language on the other—“Florida automatically
disenfranchises all felons upon conviction, and the challenged laws only
lift that punishment for felons who have completed all terms of their
sentences.”97 This inconsistency was also present in an earlier Eleventh
Circuit case, Johnson v. Governor of Florida, which referred to criminal
disenfranchisement as sui generis: “Felony disenfranchisement laws are
unlike other voting qualifications. These laws are deeply rooted in this
Nation’s history and are a punitive device stemming from criminal
law.”98 Against this ambiguous backdrop, the Middle District of
Nation’s history and are a punitive device stemming from criminal law.”).
92. Chin, supra note 59, at 1590–91 (quoting Act of June 22, 1868, ch. 69, 15 Stat. 72, 73)
(emphasis added).
93. Id. at 1588, 1607.
94. See generally Jones II, 975 F.3d at 1016.
95. Id. at 1035, 1039, 1045–46, 1049.
96. Jones I, 950 F.3d at 819.
97. Jones II, 975 F.3d at 1030, 1032 (emphasis added).
98. Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1228, 1240 (11th Cir. 2005).
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Alabama held the state’s felony disenfranchisement provision imposes
punishment, a decision presently pending on appeal in the Eleventh
Circuit.99
Criminal disenfranchisement appears unique among franchise
qualification considerations. Milena Tripković argues crime-related
disenfranchisement aims not to penalize but to denounce one who fails to
satisfy the standards of citizenship.100 If punishment is an adequate
response to crime, then disenfranchisement must respond to something
other than the crime; otherwise, disenfranchisement constitutes double
punishment.101 The double-punishment problem does not result if
disenfranchisement responds to violation of some special obligation that
arises from a specific role a person plays in society and that is regulated
by a branch of law other than criminal law.102 For example, punishment
would be a sufficient response to attempted murder when the victim is a
stranger to the perpetrator, but something more may be justified,
necessary even, to respond to attempted murder when the victim is the
perpetrator’s child, such as revocation of parental rights—a family law
sanction.103 Disenfranchisement, then, may be justified “as a measure
stemming from the rules that regulate one’s core membership status and
the special obligations that arise therefrom.”104
The stakes appear high in this debate. As most scholars see it, a
determination that criminal disenfranchisement constitutes punishment
dramatically undermines the practice. For one thing, if
disenfranchisement were punishment, then a criminal defendant would
be entitled to information pertaining to that disability prior to entering a
guilty plea.105 The franchise disability should also extend no longer than
the main punishment, thus ending lifetime disenfranchisement in the vast
majority of cases.106 Also, disenfranchisement as punishment would be
subject to cruel-and-unusual-punishment limitations.
Arguments for and against criminal disenfranchisement as punishment
99. Thompson v. Merrill, 505 F. Supp. 3d 1239, 1263 (M.D. Ala. 2020), appeal docketed, No.
21-10034 (11th Cir. Jan. 5, 2021).
100. TRIPKOVIĆ, supra note 16, at 66–68.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 67.
104. Id.
105. Gabriel J. Chin, Felon Disenfranchisement and Democracy in the Late Jim Crow Era, 5
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 329, 330–31 (2007); see also Chin, supra note 59, at 1607–08 (explaining
that prior to pleading guilty to crimes people are entitled to be informed of the criminal
punishments but not of the civil disabilities, such as disenfranchisement, that may result from their
guilty plea).
106. See TRIPKOVIĆ, supra note 16, at 41 (arguing that if disenfranchisement is punishment,
then restrictions should coincide only within the time period of the main punishment).
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notwithstanding, courts continue to treat the practice as
“unexceptionable.”107 Though some courts first affirm the practice as
nonpenal before finding it does not violate the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments,108 the nonpenal finding is
not determinative. The Middle District of Alabama held criminal
disenfranchisement constituted punishment yet that the practice did not
violate the Eighth Amendment, citing Richardson for support.109
C. Does Criminal Disenfranchisement Promote a Legitimate or
Compelling State Interest?
The last major criminal disenfranchisement debate centers on the
legislative purpose(s) the practice promotes. Courts have articulated
three primary justifications for felony disenfranchisement—election
fraud avoidance, ballot-box purity, and forfeiture by breach of the social
contract. Scholars argue these purportedly nonpenal purposes are either
constitutionally impermissible or otherwise untenable, thereby
undermining felony disenfranchisement as a practice altogether.
1. Voter Fraud
Though states undoubtedly should promote ballot-box integrity and
security, blanket felony disenfranchisement seems an excessive means to
prevent voter fraud. As mentioned above, the California Supreme Court
held disenfranchising ex-felons who had completed their sentences was
not the least restrictive means necessary to promote the state’s interest in
preventing election fraud.110 The state could, without unnecessarily
burdening franchise rights, directly target misuse of the ballot box by
enforcing laws that specifically regulate voting processes.111 Also,
technological developments bolster the security and integrity of voting,
making it nearly impossible for voter fraud to influence the outcome of
an election.112 Scholars also point out that scant evidence supports the
belief that former felons are more likely than any other persons to
107. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996) (“To the extent Davis held that a convicted
felon may be denied the right to vote, its holding is not implicated by our decision and is
unexceptionable.”).
108. See generally El-Amin v. McDonnell, No. 3:12-cv-00538-JAG, 2013 WL 1193357, at *5–
7 (E.D. Va. Mar. 22, 2013); Thiess v. State Admin. Bd. of Election L., Md., 387 F. Supp. 1038,
1041–42 (D. Md. 1974).
109. See Thompson v. Merrill, 505 F. Supp. 3d 1239, 1266–67 (M.D. Ala. 2020), appeal
docketed, No. 21-10034 (11th Cir. Jan. 5, 2021) (“[I]t would be inconsistent to determine that
something allowed by the Fourteenth Amendment violates the Eighth Amendment.”).
110. Ramirez v. Brown, 507 P.2d 1345, 1357 (1973), rev’d sub nom. Richardson v. Ramirez,
418 U.S. 24 (1974).
111. Id.at 1355–57.
112. Id. at 1355.
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commit voter fraud.113
The connection between election fraud and felony conviction seems
tenuous at best. As Mark Thompson argues, state felonydisenfranchisement laws are both over- and under-inclusive. Many state
criminal-disenfranchisement laws do not reach all election-related
crimes, such as those classified as misdemeanors, among them voter
intimidation, destroying election equipment, or causing a candidate to
withdraw from a race.114 Yet these laws do reach crimes that in no way
relate to elections or voting—e.g., destruction of a will, breaking into an
outhouse, breaking a water pipe, drug offenses, or aiding one to engage
in gambling.115 The fact that disenfranchisement is not limited to and
does not even reach all election-related crimes undermines the
contention that disenfranchisement prevents voter fraud.
2. Ballot-Box Purity
Courts continue to affirm ballot-box purity as a legitimate government
purpose criminal disenfranchisement promotes. “Purity of the ballot
box” describes a state’s interest in protecting electoral processes “against
the invasion of corruption” by persons who demonstrate anti-social
behavior. The interest in preserving the “purity of the ballot box” largely
rests on civic republicanism grounds, though some state constitutions
vest government with the power to enact laws that secure the purity of
the ballot box.116 A state’s interest in preserving ballot-box purity raises
serious doubts to the extent it focuses on an individual’s moral makeup,
fencing out from the franchise a person based on how she may vote.
However, it is less clear whether ballot-box purity constitutes a
legitimate government interest when the focus is forfeiture under a civic
republicanism citizenship theory. This latter issue will be taken up in the
social contract theory discussion below.
Traditionally, civic republicanism rests in part on each citizen’s

113. John Ghaelian, Restoring the Vote: Former Felons, International Law, and the Eighth
Amendment, 40 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 757, 778 (2013) (citing JEFF MANZA & CHRISTOPHER
UGGEN, LOCKED OUT: FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 200 (2006)).
114. See Thompson, supra note 59, at 190–91, 194 (explaining that if the legitimate purpose of
disenfranchisement is prevention of voter fraud, then any crime involving the electoral process
should result in loss of the right to vote).
115. Id. at 191–92; see also One Person, No Vote, supra note 53, at 1939–41 (discussing how
rising incarceration rates have contributed to permanent disenfranchisement for non-electionrelated crimes).
116. See e.g., TENN. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“The General Assembly shall have power to enact
laws . . . to secure . . . the purity of the ballot box.”); TEX. CONST. art. VI, § 4 (“[T]he Legislature
shall . . . make such other regulations as may be necessary to detect and punish fraud and preserve
the purity of the ballot box . . . .”).
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willingness to place the common good before her personal interests.117
Early courts held, in line with this view, that any person “rendered
infamous by conviction of felony, or other base offense indicative of
great moral turpitude,” demonstrates unfitness to vote,118 as a felony
conviction manifests a “fundamental antipathy” toward state or federal
law.119 This “antipathy” indicates an unwillingness to subordinate
personal interests to the common good. Such persons, the reasoning
goes, “lack the requisite judgment and discretion”120 to vote, or
otherwise “raised questions about their ability to vote responsibly.”121
The immediate problem with excluding one from the franchise based
on how he or she may vote is that the practice constitutes viewpoint
discrimination.122 The Supreme Court in Carrington v. Rash held a state
may not remove from the franchise any person based on how she may
vote: “‘The exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic
institutions’ cannot constitutionally be obliterated because of a fear of
the political views of a particular group of bona fide residents.”123
Likewise, in Dunn v. Blumstein, the Supreme Court held constitutionally
impermissible restrictions on voting rights designed to create an
electorate with a “common interest in all matters pertaining to [the
community’s] government.”124 Under a heightened scrutiny standard
based on viewpoint discrimination, it is unlikely that ballot-box purity
passes constitutional muster.125
Additionally, blanket felony disenfranchisement as a means to
preserve ballot-box purity presents an overbreadth problem. The
overbreadth problem stems from the fact that “felony” is an
indeterminate concept with near-unlimited reach. State legislatures have
classified so many acts as crimes malum prohibitum that states
117. The Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons: Citizenship, Criminality, and “The Purity of the
Ballot Box”, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1300, 1308–09 (1989) [hereinafter Disenfranchisement of ExFelons].
118. Washington v. State, 75 Ala. 582, 585 (1884).
119. Shepherd v. Trevino, 575 F.2d 1110, 1115 (5th Cir. 1978).
120. Washington, 75 Ala. at 585.
121. Shepherd, 575 F.2d at 1115.
122. See Karlan, supra note 17, at 1152 (explaining that the practice of viewpoint
discrimination is not a legitimate reason for disqualifying voters).
123. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 94 (1965) (quoting Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161
(1939)).
124. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 355 (1972).
125. Karlan, supra note 17, at 1152. Blanket criminal disenfranchisement may not even satisfy
rational basis review. See Stephens v. Yeomans, 327 F. Supp. 1182, 1185–86, 1188 (D.N.J. 1970)
(holding that a New Jersey statute failed the rational basis test when the statute disenfranchised
felons convicted of larceny, but not those convicted of attempted murder, kidnapping, prostitution,
extortion, and other crimes); Zeitlin, supra note 45, at 274–75 (discussing Stephens v. Yeomans).
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effectively determine the metes and bounds of citizens’ virtue under the
civic-republican justification. As one article points out, many crimes
categorized as felonies today were not common law crimes:
At common law, “when all felons were in principle subject to capital
punishment,” worrying about convicted felons’ voting rights was
almost nonsensical. Yet the expansion of the “concept of felony,”
accompanied by rising incarceration rates, has called into question the
traditional practice of “disenfranchising” convicts for life. Today, one
might be permanently disenfranchised for participating with others “in
a course of disorderly conduct,” “breaking a water pipe,” “aiding or
inducing another to engage in gambling,” or aiding, abetting, or
encouraging any “bull, bear, dog, or cock fight.”126

Given the fundamental importance of voting rights, the range of
crimes that may exclude one from the franchise must principally be
limited.127 It defies logic to conclude from the fact of any felony
conviction that a person manifests a “fundamental antipathy” to all laws
or that that the person must permanently live in infamy.128 Even under
civic republicanism, a person who breaks a water pipe is not, by that fact,
irredeemable for all time.129
The civic-republicanism justification also suffers from a conceptual
paradox. Consider the concern the Second Circuit raised in Green v.
Board of Elections:
[I]t can scarcely be deemed unreasonable for a state to decide that
perpetrators of serious crimes shall not take part in electing the
legislators who make the laws, the executives who enforce these, the
prosecutors who must try them for further violations, or the judges who
are to consider their cases. This is especially so when account is taken
of the heavy incidence of recidivism and the prevalence of organized
crime. . . . A contention that the equal protection clause requires New
York to allow convicted mafiosi to vote for district attorneys or judges
would not only be without merit but as obviously so as anything can
be.130
126. One Person, No Vote, supra note 53, at 1939–40.
127. See Chiodo v. Section 43.24 Panel, 846 N.W.2d 845, 851–57 (Iowa 2014) (interpreting the
state constitution’s “infamous crime” franchise exclusion narrowly under the strict scrutiny
standard to reach only those felonies that reveal “that voters who commit the crime would tend to
undermine the process of democratic governance through elections”).
128. See Zeitlin, supra note 45, at 290 (arguing that the state’s interest in maintaining “purity of
the ballot box” is not a sufficiently compelling interest to merit disenfranchising felons).
129. See Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons, supra note 117, at 1307–09 (arguing that civicrepublican aims are thwarted by excluding from political participation a person based on “what
may be an isolated incident” in the past, as political participation provides the path to virtue and
moral growth in republican communities, which must be built upon principles of inclusion rather
than exclusion).
130. Green v. Bd. of Elections of N.Y., 380 F.2d 445, 451–52 (2d Cir. 1967).
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As David J. Zeitlin argues, the subversive voting concern, which
flows from an assumption about the manifest antipathy the individual has
toward law generally, is not compelling because electoral processes
provide an adequate check: “[i]f a plurality of citizens come to support a
particular policy, then its victory is not the product of subversion.”131
With respect to the paradox, Green’s civic-virtue argument relies on
two implicit premises:
(1) law-abiding and law-respecting citizens vote for representatives
dedicated to promoting the greater good for all; whereas,
(2) criminal recidivists and persons with no regard for the criminal
laws of the state vote for representatives who promote the greatest
satisfaction of individual will and desire without regard to the good of
society.
Note first that little evidence supports the view that prior offenders
vote on any single issue; in other words, the view that a person convicted
of a felony exhibits voting behavior different from any citizen without a
felony conviction lacks support.132 The paradox arises because the
horrible outcome (bad elected officials) occurs only if
(a) a majority of voters fall into the second category of antipathetic
persons,
(b) enough law-abiding and law-respecting persons join the
antipathetic persons to affect the election outcome, or
(c) a majority of law-abiding and law-respecting citizens vote for bad
elected officials.
If (b) or (c) were true, then premise (1) above would be undermined.
Civic republicanism is completely undermined if (a) is true, because the
moral virtue of others could not foster the moral virtue of all. Moreover,
if (a) is true, then most people in society are bad, in which case the
franchise is not the main problem.
3. Social Contract
Felony-disenfranchisement laws find some justification in social
contract theory, which, depending on its focus, is a more or less
question-begging approach. When used to justify franchise exclusion for
violation of any law (or any law designated a felony), social contract
theory offers questionable support.133 However, when used to justify
131. Zeitlin, supra note 45, at 291.
132. Id. (citing Alec C. Ewald, An “Agenda for Demolition”: The Fallacy and the Danger of
the “Subversive Voting” Argument for Felony Disenfranchisement, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
109, 125 (2004)).
133. See Afi S. Johnson-Parris, Felon Disenfranchisement: The Unconscionable Social
Contract Breached, 89 VA. L. REV. 109, 129–31 (2003) (arguing social contract theory
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franchise exclusion as a correlative response to a distinct obligation that
emanates from citizenship status, social contract theory offers plausible
support.134 Each of these positions will be taken up in turn.
a. Obedience to Law and Social Contract Theory
Social
contract
theory
inadequately
justifies
blanket
disenfranchisement as a general response to a criminal conviction.
Courts do not fully explicate the terms between the parties to the
theoretical social contract, nor is there a single social contract theory to
which courts point as controlling the issue. Reliance on general social
contract theory, as a result, provides a question-begging response to
criminal disenfranchisement objections.
The court in Green v. Board of Elections offered the following social
contract exposition as it relates to criminal disenfranchisement:
The early exclusion of felons from the franchise by many states could
well have rested on Locke’s concept, so influential at the time, that by
entering into society every man “authorizes the society, or which is all
one, the legislature thereof, to make laws for him as the public good of
the society shall require, to the execution whereof his own assistance
(as to his own decrees) is due.” A man who breaks the laws he has
authorized his agent to make for his own governance could fairly have
been thought to have abandoned the right to participate in further
administering the compact.135

The “coulds” loom large here because the court relied in part on a
completely theoretical and undefined social contract in response to the
defendant’s express constitutional right to “equal protection of the laws.”
Locke’s social contract theory alone cannot justify criminal
disenfranchisement. It rests, for one thing, on the consent of those to be
governed by society’s laws. Since most people do not expressly consent
to be governed by the state, Locke points to tacit consent as a substitute.
David Hume answered Locke:
Should it be said, that, by living under the dominion of a prince,
which one might leave, every individual has given a tacit consent to his
authority and promised him obedience; it may be answered, that such
justifications for felon disenfranchisement conflict with utilitarian and retributivist justifications
for punishment); Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons, supra note 117, at 1304–07 (arguing felon
disenfranchisement is incompatible with the broader view of the social contract, which is more
representative of modern liberalism); cf. George Brooks, Felon Disenfranchisement: Law, History,
Policy, and Politics, 32 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 851, 896–97 (2005) (“As a policy justification,
Locke’s social contract theory has withstood the test of time”).
134. See generally TRIPKOVIĆ, supra note 16, at 69–87 (providing the basis for three
theoretical models of citizenship: the “sense of justice” model, the “civic virtue” model, and the
“common good” model).
135. Green, 380 F.2d at 451 (emphasis added).
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an implied consent can only have place, where a man imagines, that
the matter depends on his choice. But where he thinks (as all mankind
do who are born under established governments) that by his birth he
owes allegiance to a certain prince or certain form of government; it
would be absurd to infer a consent or choice, which he expressly, in
this case, renounces and disclaims.
Can we seriously say, that a poor peasant or artisan has a free choice
to leave his country, when he knows no foreign language or manners,
and lives from day to day, by the small wages which he acquires? We
may as well assert, that a man, by remaining in a vessel, freely consents
to the dominion of the master; though he was carried on board while
asleep and must leap into the ocean, and perish, the moment he leaves
her.136

With tacit consent resting on dubious grounds, one must truly consider
tacit consent itself insufficient to divest one of her right to participate in
the political processes that govern her life.
For another thing, when the focus is on disobedience to law generally,
reliance on Locke’s social contract theory collapses any meaningful
distinction between punishment and nonpenal sanction. The problem is
straightforward: if, under a social contract theory, a state responds to
every felony, maybe even misdemeanors, with disenfranchisement, then
nothing clearly separates disenfranchisement from other ordinary state
responses to crime, such as imprisonment or a fine.
Such a general response to crime calls into question whether the
state’s response is rational and proportional.137 The Lockean social
contract did not subject citizens to every whim of a legislative body.
Rather, “[e]ach transgression may be punished to that degree, and with
so much severity, as will suffice to make it an ill bargain to the offender,
give him cause to repent, and terrify others from doing the like.”138
The extent to which felony disenfranchisement proves a rational and
proportional response to disobedience to law depends on the
transgression and the length of disenfranchisement. But the Supreme
Court has made clear that it is within each state’s discretion to determine
disenfranchiseable transgressions and the length of disenfranchisement.
Many states make conviction of any felony a disenfranchiseable
transgression. A number of states even permanently disenfranchise
136. DAVID HUME, Of the Original Contract, in ESSAYS: MORAL, POLITICAL, AND LITERARY
475 (Eugene F. Miller ed., Liberty Fund Inc. rev. ed. 1985) (emphasis added).
137. See Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons, supra note 117, at 1306–07 (noting that
disenfranchisement for life fails to meet the standards of rational and proportional punishment
inherent in the social contract).
138. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 8 (J.W. Gough ed., Basil,
Blackwell, 3d ed. 1966) (1689); Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons, supra note 117, at 1306–07.
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persons convicted of any felony. “Felony” is an indeterminate concept,
reaching, as discussed above, breaking a water pipe and drug
possession.139 Is it rational and proportional to disenfranchise a person
for five years for breaking a water pipe, or for life for possessing a drug
prohibited for personal use by statute? A fine, temporary incarceration,
and restitution (where appropriate) make breaking a water pipe or
possessing any drug an ill bargain to the transgressor. So, adding on
disenfranchisement for life, or even for five years, exceeds what is
rational and proportional to the transgression.140
The social contract justification also fails to address state subterfuge.
Consider Hunter v. Underwood.141 There, the United States Supreme
Court held unconstitutional Section 182 of the Alabama Constitution,
which made conviction of “any crime . . . involving moral turpitude”
grounds for disenfranchisement. State administrative interpretations
made petty larceny and presenting a hot check (neither of which was a
felony) crimes of “moral turpitude.”142 The Court found that delegates to
the 1901 state constitutional convention believed that the crimes covered
by the disenfranchisement provision—including “vagrancy, living in
adultery, and wife beating”143— were committed more often by Black
persons than white persons. The Court held the constitutional provision
invalid due to the racially discriminatory purpose in enacting the law.144
One might argue that when a state by subterfuge disenfranchises a
person or group of persons, citizens owe no duty to obey. But that does
not resolve the issue here. Who gets to decide if the disenfranchisement
is accomplished by fiat? What if the subterfuge is too difficult to detect
or prove? The provision at issue in Hunter existed for eighty-four years
before being struck down, perhaps due to the difficulty in detecting or
proving a discriminatory purpose, or perhaps because the citizen must
incur the cost of challenging the state’s act, a cost that far exceeds any
poll tax that ever existed.
The general problem with criminal disenfranchisement is more acute
than the single account of subterfuge in Hunter v. Underwood, as the
practice increased among states following the Civil War in a clear effort

139. One Person, No Vote, supra note 53, at 1940 (noting that the modern concept of “felony”
includes a wide range of conduct).
140. Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons, supra note 117, at 1307 ( “[P]ermanent expulsion from
the political community is imposed equally on all felons without regard for the relative severity of
their crimes, and is wholly disproportionate to a single violation.”).
141. Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985).
142. Id. at 226, 233.
143. Id. at 232.
144. Id. at 229, 233.
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to disenfranchise newly freed Black Americans.145 Moreover, even
where a plaintiff shows that race was a motivating factor behind a state’s
disenfranchisement practice, courts provide states an out if the state
shows either a) that the provision would have been adopted even without
race as a factor, or b) that a subsequent legislative amendment eliminated
the initial discriminatory taint, although maintaining the criminaldisenfranchisement practice generally.146 Generations of Black
Americans have been fenced out from democratic processes by the
machinations of political elites via the state. The social contract theory
cannot be used as a sword and shield to aid the state in any ill design
whatsoever against its citizens without either calling into question the
legitimacy of the state or the validity of the social contract theory upon
which courts rely to justify criminal disenfranchisement.
Locke’s social contract theory is only one among many, many other
contractarian thought experiments, none of which to date has been
constitutionally ratified, at least not expressly. When general
disobedience to law is the primary focus, social contract theory offers
only question-begging support to what otherwise should be fully
resolved by clear and express constitutional provisions, which are
transparent to every citizen and to which federal and state governments
are actually bound.
b. Citizenship Obligations and Social Contract Theory
Social contract theory offers some insight into plausible citizenship
models from which one might extract distinct, active obligations that
correspond to the rights that attend passive citizenship status.147 The idea
that citizens are vested with certain political rights that correspond in
some way to citizen obligations finds support in case law.148 Presently,
Congress lacks power to involuntarily expatriate citizens, though this has

145. Jeff Manza & Christopher Uggen, Locked Out: Felon Disenfranchisement and American
Democracy 49–55 (2006).
146. See, e.g., Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1223–24 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding
1968 amendment to 1868 Florida disenfranchisement law removed any racial discriminatory taint
in the latter because the former narrowed disenfranchisement without an impermissible motive);
Cotton v. Fordice, 157 F.3d 388, 391–92 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding, even though 1890 Mississippi
criminal disenfranchisement provision was enacted with racially discriminatory intent, 1950
amendment removing burglary and 1968 amendment adding murder and rape as crimes subject to
disenfranchisement removed initial taint).
147. See generally TRIPKOVIĆ, supra note 16, at 69–87 (discussing three different models for
qualifying citizen’s duty owed to a state).
148. See Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717, 733–36 (1952) (derailing fair-weather
citizenship); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 159–61 (1963) (discussing the
protections and obligations associated with citizenship).
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not always been the judicial stance.149 Nevertheless, since case law
presently allows states to disenfranchise citizens for a criminal
conviction, stripping them, that is, of the sine qua non of citizenship in
contemporary democracies, some account must be made to justify this
state practice—an account which social contract theory may supply.
Milena Tripković extrapolates three theoretical models within social
contract theory that plausibly explain franchise restrictions, two of which
will be described below.150
The first model she finds within modern liberalism (a more egalitarian
philosophical tradition than the liberalism of John Locke and Thomas
Hobbes); she labels this the “sense of justice” model.151 From John
Rawls’ hypothetical contract situation, wherein parties interested in
creating a polity negotiate behind a veil of ignorance152 to identify and
endorse fundamental principles to guide future policy-making, each
member within the polity that arises may be expected to possess qualities
“that make her a ‘reliable co-member.’”153 The baseline quality each
person must possess is the “capacity for a sense of justice.”154 People
acquire the capacity for a sense of justice through socialization processes
from early childhood through adulthood, wherein an “overwhelming
majority” of persons accept and internalize just principles that allow each
person to live with others on fair, reasonable, and mutually agreeable
terms.155 Under such a model, any person lacking the capacity for a
sense of justice, which is not synonymous with general or strict
obedience to law, could rightly be deprived of certain citizenship rights
or entitlements.156
Tripković locates the second model within the civic republicanism

149. Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 267 (1967).
150. TRIPKOVIĆ, supra note 16, at 70. Tripković draws from liberal, republican, and
communitarian political philosophy to develop her three citizenship models. Only the liberalism
and republicanism formulations will be discussed here, as these two philosophical traditions have
the strongest connection to American law and governance.
151. Id. at 72. Tripkovic bases her “sense of justice” model on the liberal egalitarian view of
democratic theory. See also Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons, supra note 117, at 1305–07
(discussing the justifications for felon disenfranchisement under Locke’s social contract theory).
152. Rawls’ veil of ignorance is an abstraction that requires parties to bargain in ignorance of
their natural endowments, wealth, or other contingent factors that place a person in an
advantageous position in society. Without knowing where one will end up in society once the veil
is lifted, parties are thought to bargain rationally toward what benefits all within a polity. JOHN
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 10–15, 122–24 (Harv. Univ. Press rev. ed. 1999).
153. TRIPKOVIĆ, supra note 16, at 74 (being a “reliable co-member” requires compliance with
the mutually agreed upon principles that form the basis for an orderly society).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 74–76.
156. Id. at 74, 76.
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tradition and terms this the “civic virtue” model.157 Equal citizenship
under this model depends on two conditions. First, each member must
possess civic virtue. Republicanism is less atomistic than liberalism.
While liberal thought centers on individual liberty, human flourishing in
republican thought centers on each polity member’s commitment to
promote the “common interests of citizens” and the political institutions
that enable and secure their fulfillment.158 Membership in the polity,
then, requires each member to develop the requisite traits that enable a
person to comprehend fellow citizens’ interests and that animate in each
citizen the requisite fidelity to the political institutions that sustain those
interests and, thereby, the polity.159 One develops civic virtue through
socialization processes similar to those described within the liberal
tradition, but the civic virtue model stresses “the importance of
continuous interaction between members in a political process of
negotiation of societal goals and values.”160
The second equal citizenship condition within the civic-virtue model
requires each member to be self-governing. Republicanism shares with
liberalism the priority of free persons as a necessary condition to one’s
membership in a given polity.161 But, whereas noninterference defines
“freedom” in the liberal tradition, republicanism defines “freedom” as
nondomination. The distinction between the two is important here:
Since liberals associate freedom with noninterference, a slave of a good
master, or a skillful slave who can avoid being interfered with, is to be
considered free, as most of her choices remain unconstrained. For
republicans, such conception of freedom is flawed, since it ignores the
status of domination and dependence that exists even if the master
leaves his slave alone. Thus, while noninterference emphasizes a
factual lack of interference with one’s choices, nondomination relates
to the status in which domination can never occur—since no one has a
capacity or power to interfere in one’s choices.162

Republican citizenship, then, requires freedom “from domination as a
status or condition of subordination.”163 Under the civic virtue model,
the polity would be justified in denying equal citizenship rights to any

157.
158.
159.
valuing
itself”).
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id. at 77.
Id. at 79.
Id. at 77–82 (explaining that the political component of citizenship contributes to people
“being a member of the political community, and consequently, the good of the polity
Id. at 77.
Id. at 78–79.
Id. at 79.
Id. at 81.
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person lacking civic virtue or self-dominion.164
From these social-contract-oriented frameworks, Tripković argues
political communities would be entitled to disenfranchise a criminal
offender who lacks the ability to acquire requisite moral qualities that
affirm one’s unqualified membership in a given polity.165 Remember,
Tripković argues that crime-related disenfranchisement aims not to
penalize, but to denounce one who fails to satisfy the standards of
citizenship.166
Under the sense-of-justice model, disenfranchisement would be
justified in very few cases, a conclusion that likewise limits
disenfranchisement under the civic-virtue model. The sense-of-justice
model requires citizens to possess a “capacity” for a sense of justice,
which does not require one to be just or to do justice at all times. Within
the general (offender and non-offender) population, a very small
minority of persons completely lack requisite qualities—e.g., empathy
and conscience—to muster the moral powers necessary to act justly.167
And only “those criminals who do not possess a moral code (which can
only be determined by looking at who they are and not so much at what
they have done)” would be subject to disenfranchisement.168 Criminals
who lack a capacity for a sense of justice would also be incapable of
developing civic virtue at any point in their lives, which, under the civicvirtue model, would subject them to disenfranchisement.169
Yet, due to its self-dominion requirement, the civic-virtue model may
justify disenfranchisement in a larger number of cases than the sense-ofjustice model. Imprisonment substantially limits a prisoner’s ability to
govern herself, as the near-complete loss of liberty does away with any
meaningful semblance of self-governance.170 In affirming “the
democratic principle that those who lack civil liberties cannot rule
164. Id. at 77, 81 (requiring civic virtue as a precondition for participation in decision-making).
165. Id. at 81–82 (“[T]o be a citizen, one needs to be able to engage with others politically,
which is dependent on possessing specific traits, the combination of which constitutes ‘civic
virtue.’”).
166. Id. at 67 (stating that while punishment is a primary reaction to crime, disenfranchisement
acts as a regulation on one’s obligations arising under citizenship).
167. Id. at 95–101 (defining the characteristics that demonstrate a lack of “capacity for a sense
of justice,” where disenfranchisement would be proper for only criminals that exhibit those
characteristics).
168. Id. at 101.
169. Id. at 113–15 (noting that “the foundation of civic virtue lies in the notion of co-citizen
cooperation and compromise,” and thus disenfranchisement is justified for those who lack a
capacity for empathy).
170. Id. at 103–05 (explaining the pro-disenfranchisement proposition that civil liberties are a
precondition for collective self-government, and thus the loss of personal liberty results in the loss
of other rights, including the right to vote).
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themselves politically,” a state arguably would be justified in
disenfranchising its prisoners.171 A person serving her sentence on
parole, probation, or some other means outside prison walls, arguably
retains enough personal liberty to be a self-governing agent.172
Tripković challenges the intuitive appeal of the prisoner-dominion
nexus by distinguishing between personal liberty—freedom to travel, to
associate with whom one chooses, to live everyday life as one chooses,
etc.—and political liberty, or freedom to participate in political decisionmaking on equal terms with others.173 A person enjoys self-dominion
under the civic-virtue model if, as publicly understood, she enjoys the
same “prospect of liberty” available to all citizens and in equal
measure.174 She argues that prisoners remain political subjects, not
“objects of state patronage,” and, as a result, enjoy the “prospect for
achieving political liberty” necessary to retain sufficient self-dominion
while imprisoned.175
Under Tripković’s account, the mere fact that one lacks the requisite
moral qualities to be a reliable co-member in a given polity is not
sufficient to disenfranchise any person.176 A person who never runs
afoul of criminal law engages in no sanctionable conduct.177 Moreover, a
polity cannot justifiably disenfranchise a citizen for violation of any
criminal law whatsoever, not only because such a response creates a
double-punishment problem, but also because a polity needs “solid proof
of the breach of citizenship obligations in the form of the crime
committed.”178
Tripković identifies two types of crimes that may justify
disenfranchisement. First, anti-state crimes where the objective is to
disrupt or harm the polity’s “existence and normal functioning” may
justify restricting the offender’s right to vote.179 Not unsurprisingly,
many of the crimes she identifies as falling under the anti-state category
are included among the acts that may initiate expatriation proceedings in
171. Id. at 104 (quoting Peter Ramsay, Faking Democracy with Prisoners’ Voting Rights, LSE
LAW, SOCIETY AND ECONOMY WORKING PAPERS 14 (London Sch. of Econ. & Pol. Sci., Working
Paper No. 7/2013)).
172. Id. at 105 (emphasizing the loss of personal liberty and formal dependence on the
executive as grounds for disenfranchisement).
173. Id. at 103 (noting that while it seems contradictory to suggest that prisoners enjoy liberty,
this does not relate to the current status of personal liberty, but merely to a general prospect of
liberty).
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 130.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 131–32.
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the United States.180 Second, crimes that limit another person’s
membership in the polity may justify restricting the offender’s right to
vote; the primordial example of such a crime is murder.181 This second
category is justified on the ground that a polity cannot exist without its
citizens; attacking a member of the polity, then, “concurrently attacks the
polity.”182
Presently, American law lacks the theoretical underpinning to justify
blanket criminal disenfranchisement under any social-contract theory.
Courts do not spell out the terms of any social contract or the contours of
citizenship obligations in sufficient detail to ascertain the baseline for
citizens to enjoy unqualified citizenship rights. The social contract
justification for blanket criminal disenfranchisement, in other words, is
grossly undertheorized and, as a result, unjustly applied. Rather than rely
heavily upon social contract theory or civic republicanism generally,
courts cite Richardson, a case that read criminal disenfranchisement to
fall outside the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause.
II. THE “SLAVERY AND INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE” CLAUSE
The Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution has
barely factored into the criminal-disenfranchisement debate.183 In fact,
the Thirteenth Amendment remains undertheorized and underutilized
among the Reconstruction amendments particularly, and among all civilrights-related amendments generally. Within the Thirteenth
Amendment’s text, the punishment-for-crime exception has received
little attention in courts and academia.
The time is ripe to take the exception to task and ascertain its
contours. The exception to the Thirteenth Amendment reads
uncomfortably clear:

180. Id. at 132 (recognizing examples of the anti-state crime category as “terrorism, military
coup, sedition, espionage, treason, murdering highest state representatives, betrayal of state secrets,
. . . [and] war crimes,” among others). For examples of voluntary acts for which a U.S. citizen
loses her nationality, see 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(7), which includes “committing any act of treason
against, or attempting by force to overthrow, or bearing arms against, the United States . . . .”
among other similar crimes against the nation.
181. TRIPKOVIĆ, supra note 16, at 132.
182. Id.
183. See Re & Re, supra note 45, at 1641–68 (identifying the basis for the criminaldisenfranchisement debate as the felon disenfranchisement “affirmative sanction” from Richardson
v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974), the scope and meaning of “other crimes” in Section 2 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the argument that the Fifteenth Amendment impliedly repealed Section 2
of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the prohibition contained in Section 2(a) of the Voting Rights
Act against any “voting qualification” that “results in” disenfranchisement “on account of race”).
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Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist
within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction. 184

On its face, the exception modifies slavery and involuntary servitude,
assuming a meaningful distinction exists between the two. Yet,
considering courts do not always interpret constitutional clauses as they
are written, it is worth investigating both the historical and present
understanding of the exception before inquiring about the scope of the
Thirteenth Amendment, exception and all.
A. How Did the Framers of the Thirteenth Amendment Understand Its
Exception?
The exception to the Thirteenth Amendment did not go unquestioned
during the drafting debates in the Senate. Senator Charles Sumner
specifically objected to the exception, stating:
Let me say frankly that I should prefer a form of expression different
from that which has the sanction of the committee. They have selected
what was intended for the old Jeffersonian ordinance, sacred in our
history, although, let me add, they have not imitated it closely. But I
must be pardoned if I venture to doubt the expediency of perpetuating
in the Constitution language which, if it have any signification, seems
to imply that “slavery or involuntary servitude” may be provided “for
the punishment of crime.”185

Senator Sumner’s initial objection focused on the exception’s
language. Neither/nor (neither this nor that) is the negative equivalent of
either/or (either this or that) and both/and (both this and that). No
punctuation separates “slavery” from “involuntary servitude.” Since
“nor” serves as a conjunction, the “except” modifies both slavery and
184. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 (emphasis added).
185. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1482 (1864). The “old Jeffersonian ordinance” to
which Senator Sumner referred was the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which stated:
There shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in the said territory, otherwise
than in the punishment of crimes, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted:
Provided always, That any person escaping into the same, from whom labor or service
is lawfully claimed in any one of the original States, such fugitive may be lawfully
reclaimed, and conveyed to the person claiming his or her labor or service as aforesaid.
Northwest Ordinance U.S.C.A. art. VI (West 1787) (emphasis added). Thomas Jefferson originally
drafted the slavery prohibition and exception to include in the Land Ordinance of 1784. The
language was later incorporated into the Northwest Ordinance. See, e.g., ERIC FONER, THE
SECOND FOUNDING: HOW THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION REMADE THE CONSTITUTION
46 (2019) (stating that the prisoner exemption in the Thirteenth Amendment originated in Thomas
Jefferson’s proposed Land Ordinance of 1784, which migrated to the Northwest Ordinance of
1787); MICHAEL VORENBERG, FINAL FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR, THE ABOLITION OF SLAVERY,
AND THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 12–13 (2001) (noting that Thomas Jefferson had drafted an
earlier version of the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which radical constitutionalists used as proof
the framers envisioned a nation free of slavery).
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involuntary servitude such that either slavery or involuntary servitude
“may be provided ‘for the punishment of crime,’”186 as Senator Sumner
plainly gleaned from the text.
For Senator Sumner, the Thirteenth Amendment provided a unique
opportunity clearly and unequivocally to “sweep slavery out of
existence” forever.187 The proposed language from the Northwest
Ordinance “introduce[d] a doubt” that left open the universal
emancipation question he hoped to resolve by way of the Thirteenth
Amendment.188 Senator Sumner elaborated on his objection:
There are words here, I have said, which are entirely inapplicable to our
time. They are the limitation, “otherwise than in the punishment of
crimes whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.” Now, unless
I err, there is an implication from those words that men may be
enslaved as . . . punishment of crimes whereof they shall have been
duly convicted. There was a reason, I have said, for that at the time, for
I understand that it was the habit in certain parts of the country to
convict persons or . . . doom them as slaves for life as . . . punishment
for crime, and it was not proposed to prohibit this habit. But slavery in
our day is something distinct, perfectly well known, requiring no words
of distinction outside of itself. Why, therefore, add “nor involuntary
servitude otherwise than in the punishment of crimes whereof the party
shall have been duly convicted?” To my mind they are entirely
surplusage.189

Notably, Senator Sumner considered both the reference to
“involuntary servitude” and the exception for “punishment of crimes” as
surplusage. He viewed the exception for punishment irrelevant to the
issue of “slavery.” As he saw it, the punishment practices of states in
1787 had nothing to do with “the unnatural pretension of property in
man,” which was the practice of slavery in his day.190 With respect to
“involuntary servitude,” which he included in his surplusage charge, it is
not clear from his comments whether he felt the addition redundant of
“slavery” or extraneous to it. As will be shown below, the term
“involuntary servitude” was sometimes used as a substitute for “slavery,”
which may have formed part of Senator Sumner’s concern. Nevertheless,
the language he offered as a substitute omitted the surplusage: “All
persons are equal before the law, so that no person can hold another as a
slave; and the Congress may make all laws necessary and proper to carry
this article into effect everywhere within the United States and the
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1482 (1864).
Id.
Id. at 1488.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 1479.
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jurisdiction thereof.”191
In response to Senator Sumner’s objections, Senator Lyman Trumbull,
Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, noted that the committee
considered both Senator Sumner’s proposed language and the language
mirroring the Northwest Ordinance and opted for the latter.192 Senator
Trumbull added: “a majority of the committee thought they were the best
words; they accomplish the object; and I cannot see why the Senator
from Massachusetts should be so pertinacious about particular
words.”193 The committee preferred language familiar to the people and
courts in the United States, which the anti-slavery provision in the
Northwest Ordinance supplied.194 At Senator Trumbull’s request,
Senator Sumner withdrew his proposed amendment.195
While slavery may have been “distinct” and “perfectly well known,”
involuntary servitude was ill-defined. Slavery, for example, is a form of
involuntary servitude. In fact, the terms slavery and involuntary
servitude were used interchangeably leading up to the Thirteenth
Amendment. For example, in 1863, Representative James M. Ashley of
Ohio first introduced a proposed constitutional amendment “prohibiting
slavery, or involuntary servitude, in all of the States and Territories now
owned or which may be hereafter acquired by the United States.”196
Likewise, an early petition by the Women’s Loyal National League,
spearheaded by Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony, implored
Congress to emancipate “all persons of African descent held to
involuntary service or labor in the United States.”197 The petition that
191. Id. at 1483.
192. Id. at 1488.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 1488–89. Senators Trumbull and Jacob M. Howard also considered Senator
Sumner’s proposed amendment too broad, as it drew on French Revolution principles of equality.
Senator Trumbull thought it incredible to look to the French Revolution “to find the proper words
for a constitution,” since, as he saw it, “their constitutions were failures.” Id. at 1488. Senator
Howard further objected to Senator Sumner’s reference to all persons being “equal before the
law.” Id. Such language would, in his view, disrupt existing societal norms: “I suppose before the
law a woman would be equal to a man, a woman would be as free as a man. A wife would be equal
to her husband and as free as her husband before the law.” Id. Senator Howard preferred to “go
back to the good old Anglo-Saxon language employed by our fathers in the ordinance of 1787, an
expression which has been adjudicated upon repeatedly, which is perfectly well understood both
by the public and by judicial tribunals . . . .” Id. at 1489.
195. Id. at 1488.
196. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1863) (emphasis added).
197. Letter from Susan B. Anthony & Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Women’s Loyal Nat’l League,
to the Women of the Republic (Jan. 25, 1864) (Records of the U.S. Senate, National Archives)
(emphasis added); see also VORENBERG, supra note 185, at 39 (producing a portion of the
Women’s Loyal National League’s 1864 Congressional petition and identifying the petition as one
of the earliest efforts to call specifically for a constitutional amendment abolishing slavery).
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was circulated for signatures requested recipients “to sign and circulate
this petition for the ENTIRE ABOLITION OF SLAVERY.”198
There is also some evidence in the drafting history of the Thirteenth
Amendment that “involuntary servitude” served as a substitute or
alternative term for “slavery.” Senator Willard Saulsbury, Sr., a northern
Democratic Party member, offered an extensive Article XIII that
preserved southern states’ right to keep “[p]ersons held to service or
labor for life.”199 His proposed amendment vested southern states with
veto power over any Congressional attempt to “impair or abolish such
right of service.”200 “Involuntary servitude, except for crime,” would not
be established in the District of Columbia, but southern slaveholders
could not be denied travel thereto “with persons held to service or labor
for life.”201 His proposed amendment preserved “the right of transit with
persons held to involuntary labor or service from one State to
another.”202 Senator Saulsbury’s proposed amendment also provided a
process to readmit confederate states, leaving to each state the right to
“either prohibit or sustain the right to involuntary labor or service.”203
The focus on “service or labor for life” ensured southern states the
“present right of representation in section two, article one, of [the United
States] Constitution.”204 States that recognized “involuntary servitude”
could apply to Congress for financial reimbursement for up to “one
hundred dollars for each person liberated.”205
The word “slavery” appeared only twice in Senator Saulsbury’s
proposed amendment. Section 12 prohibited “the traffic in slaves with
Africa” on “pain of death.”206 Section 19 provided,
When all of the several States shall have abolished slavery, then and
thereafter slavery or involuntary servitude except as a punishment for
crime shall never be established or tolerated in any of the States or
Territories of the United States, and they shall be forever free.207

The last section prohibited Congress from altering any provisions
198. Anthony & Stanton, supra note 197 (typeface in original); VORENBERG, supra note 185,
at 39.
199. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1489 (1864).
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. (emphasis added). For apportionment purposes, Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution
counted “the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of
Years,” but only “three fifths of all other Persons.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
205. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1490 (1864).
206. Id. at 1489. The United States Constitution prohibited Congress from taking any action to
abolish the slave trade before 1808. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1.
207. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1490 (1864) (emphasis added).
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“relating to involuntary labor or servitude” without the “consent of all
the States maintaining such servitude.”208
Involuntary servitude is conceptually broader than slavery. It captures
every form of forced labor. In the early nineteenth century, slaveowners
in territories governed by the Northwest Ordinance used long-term
indentures to avoid the prohibition against slavery.209 The territories
(later to become states) of Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, and
Wisconsin grappled with the issue of “whether indentured service
(limited to [B]lack people in fact and by statute in these territories)
violated the Northwest Ordinance’s prohibition on ‘involuntary
servitude.’”210 The answer to the question turned on whether the
indenture was truly voluntary.211 Other long-term labor contracts or
forced labor contract practices, such as peonage (contract labor to pay off
debt), which was a practice undoubtedly familiar to the framers of the
Thirteenth Amendment, would also qualify as involuntary servitude.212
Yet the scope of involuntary servitude or the Thirteenth Amendment’s
impact on the forms of servitude that may qualify as involuntary
servitude received “little discussion in Congress.”213
Nothing in the drafting debates suggests the framers of the Thirteenth
Amendment intended the crime exception to qualify only involuntary
servitude. It is not at all clear that the drafters intended “involuntary
servitude” to mean anything more than slavery, or that they intended
“involuntary servitude” to do anything other than capture future
permutations the practice of slavery might take. What is clear, as Scott
W. Howe observes, is that “no voices during the promulgation of the
amendment in Congress proclaimed” that the exception did not allow for
slavery as punishment.214 Whatever doubts remain as to what the
208. Id.
209. Robert J. Steinfeld, The Invention of Free Labor: The Employment Relationship in
English & American Law and Culture, 1350–1870, 141 (Thomas A. Green ed.,1991).
210. Id.
211. See id. at 141–46 (noting that the 1802 Ohio state constitution permitted voluntary
indentured service, an 1828 Illinois Supreme Court ruling struck involuntary indentured service
but left intact voluntary indentured service, and an 1821 Indiana Supreme Court ruling maintained
voluntary indentured service provided that the servant remain in the service of the master without
complaint, but that a servant of legal age may terminate the servitude when they are no longer
willing to serve).
212. In 1867, two years after the Thirteenth Amendment was ratified, Congress passed the
Anti-Peonage Act of 1867, making unlawful “the holding of any person to service or labor under
the system known as peonage.” Peonage Abolition Act, ch. 187, 14 Stat. 546 (1867) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1581–1588).
213. FONER, supra note 185, at 43 (explaining that while there was little discussion in Congress
about the Thirteenth Amendment’s impact on various forms of involuntary servitude, the door
remained open to Congress acting against them).
214. Scott W. Howe, Slavery as Punishment: Original Public Meaning, Cruel and Unusual
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drafters meant by the exception might be resolved by taking a look at
how the exception played out after the states ratified the Thirteenth
Amendment and how Congress reacted.
B. How Did Congress Understand the Exception to the Thirteenth
Amendment After It Was Ratified?
Southern states exploited the exception shortly after the Thirteenth
Amendment was ratified. Former slave-owning states enacted Black
Codes—“a set of vagrancy laws, legal apprenticeships, and broad local
police powers that forced ex-slaves to enter into labor contracts against
their will”—that severely limited Black Americans’ freedom.215 A
criminal conviction resulted in forced labor and, in some instances, the
sale of Black Americans.216
Some members of Congress called attention to reports of Black
Americans being sold into slavery for petty crimes. For example, Senator
William Higby of California lamented:
There is now no slavery within the limits of this Government,
except—and God knows I wish we had that amendment before us at
this time, for I believe a two-thirds vote would wipe out that
exception—except for crime. There is no good reason under heaven
why a man for crime should be sold into slavery. It is time when in this
country there should be no servitude, not even for crime. We see to-day
in the re-organized States of the South that for the most frivolous
offenses they are selling the men who were once in slavery into slavery
again.217

Representative Henry C. Deming of Connecticut pointed out southern
states’ “perennial perfidy to the [B]lack race”:
They have ratified [the Thirteenth Amendment] with a construction
that it merely abolishes the infamy of buying, selling, and owning
human beings; and under the exceptional clause (“except as a
punishment for crime”) reconstructed North Carolina is now selling
[B]lack men into slavery for petty larceny, and reconstructed South
Carolina, Mississippi, and Louisiana are fettering the contract system
Punishment, and the Neglected Clause in the Thirteenth Amendment, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 983, 988
(2009).
215. See VORENBERG, supra note 185, at 230 (discussing Mississippi and South Carolina’s
“black codes” that required formerly enslaved persons to enter into labor contracts unwillingly);
see also The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 70 (1873) (explaining that southern
states enacted legislation severely limiting the freedoms of Black Americans following the
ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment).
216. FONER, supra note 185, at 48–49 (discussing various apprenticeship laws that required
Black men to enter labor contracts or endure punishment for vagrancy, whereby those convicted of
this crime could be sold for a term of years into forced labor).
217. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 427 (1866) (emphasis added).
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with so many subtle formalities, forfeitures, and conditions, that a
modern labor contract is much like an old-fashion slave-pen—a trap to
hold the freedman to his work and cheat him of his wages. 218

And, in support of an act to clarify the exception to the Thirteenth
Amendment, Representative John A. Kasson of Iowa offered the
following from a Maryland paper:
NEGROES SOLD AS PUNISHMENT FOR CRIME.
PUBLIC SALE.—The undersigned will offer for sale at the court-house
door in the city of Annapolis, at eleven o’clock a. m. on Saturday, the
22d of December, a negro man named John Johnson, aged about forty
years. The said negro was convicted at the October term, 1866, of the
circuit court of Anne Arundel county, of larceny, and sentenced to be
sold.
WILLIAM BRYAN, Sheriff.
Baltimore, December 24.—Four negroes convicted of larceny, and ordered to
be sold by Judge Magruder at Annapolis, were sold on Saturday last. 219

Representative Kasson proposed a joint resolution to disambiguate the
Thirteenth Amendment’s exception:
Whereas the Congress of the United States at the second session of the
Thirty-Eighth Congress, proposed to the several States for adoption the
thirteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which
has now, by the ratification of three fourths of the States of the Union,
become part of the Constitution, and which by its terms forever
prohibits slavery or involuntary servitude, “except as a punishment for
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted;” and whereas
in some parts of this Union it is asserted and maintained that,
notwithstanding said amendment, it is lawful to sell or otherwise
commit into unofficial subjection to slavery persons who may be
convicted of offenses against the law, by reason whereof certain
inferior tribunals have adjudged free citizens of the United States to be
so disposed of as to reestablish chattel slavery for life or for years,
against the principles of the Christian religion, of civilization, and of
the Constitution of the United States, which now recognizes no
involuntary servitude, except to the law and to the officers of its
administration. Now therefore,
Be it resolved, &c., That the true intent and meaning of said
amendment prohibits slavery or involuntary servitude forever in all
forms, except in direct execution of a sentence imposing a definite
penalty according to law, which penalty cannot, without violation of
the Constitution, impose any other servitude than that of
imprisonment or other restraint of freedom under the immediate
control of officers of the law and according to the usual course
218. Id. at 332.
219. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 345 (1867).
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thereof, to the exclusion of all unofficial control of the person so held
in servitude . . . .220

To support congressional power to define the exception by an act of
Congress, Representative Kasson pointed to the Thirteenth
Amendment’s enforcement provision.221 He hoped the resolution would
aid courts in construing the amendment to end any form of chattel
slavery.222
In making his case for the resolution, Representative Kasson appeared
to use slavery and involuntary servitude interchangeably. He argued that
the present Constitution did not allow selling a person into “slavery,” but
added
that there must be a direct condemnation into that condition under the
control of the officers of the law, like the sentence of a man to hard
labor in the State prison in the regular and ordinary course of law, and
that is the only kind of involuntary servitude known to the Constitution
and the law.223

Nevertheless, it is clear by his comments that the resolution’s primary
purpose was to signal that the people who ratified the Thirteenth
Amendment “never intended chattel slavery to be reestablished under
any circumstances.”224
Representative Kasson’s resolution passed in the House, but never
went to a vote in the Senate.225 Congress missed an opportunity to define
“involuntary servitude” and the exception’s scope. Congress was content
to let courts interpret the Thirteenth Amendment, exception and all.
C. Judicial Treatment of the Thirteenth Amendment and Its Exception.
Judicial opinions provide some insight into the meaning and scope of
involuntary servitude, but the exception’s scope remains largely
unadjudicated. Nevertheless, a look at the court’s treatment of
“involuntary servitude” sheds light on the Thirteenth Amendment’s
scope, which may help explain the exception.
The United States Supreme Court first interpreted the meaning of

220. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 344 (1867) (emphasis added).
221. Id. at 345 (“I find the right in the second clause of the amendment to define the species of
slavery or involuntary servitude into which a free man may be lawfully condemned by the laws of
the country.”).
222. Id. (affirming that the resolution would have the “legal force necessary” to construe laws
in the “interest of freedom and for the protection of individual rights” such that the grounds on
which the courts could rule would be strengthened).
223. Id. at 345–46 (emphasis added).
224. Id. at 346.
225. FONER, supra note 185, at 49.
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involuntary servitude in the Slaughter-House Cases.226 There, butchers
in Louisiana challenged a state law requiring them to slaughter animals
outside the city limits and only within facilities run by a single
corporation that could impose landing and slaughtering charges.227 The
Court rejected the plaintiffs’ claims that the statute created an
involuntary servitude by denying them equal privilege to own a
slaughterhouse or otherwise forcing them to practice their trade only in
one location to the sole benefit of a single corporation.228 Involuntary
servitude applied only to people, not property, the Court reasoned,
adding,
The word servitude is of larger meaning than slavery, as the latter is
popularly understood in this country, and the obvious purpose was to
forbid all shades and conditions of African slavery. It was very well
understood that in the form of apprenticeship for long terms, as it had
been practiced in the West India Islands, on the abolition of slavery by
the English government, or by reducing the slaves to the condition of
serfs attached to the plantation, the purpose of the article might have
been evaded, if only the word slavery had been used.229

The Court cited no legislative history, of which little is available, to
support the “obvious purpose” behind involuntary servitude in the
Thirteenth Amendment but focused on the broad implications of the
word servitude, which it interpreted to include slavery as “understood in
this country.”230
In his dissent, Justice Field interpreted involuntary servitude in a
manner similar to the majority’s interpretation but came to a different
conclusion. The Thirteenth Amendment did not use the word slavery as
confined to “African slavery alone,” but prohibited slavery of any
person, “and not merely slavery in the strict sense of the term, but
involuntary servitude in every form,” which includes “all other forms of
compulsory service for the mere benefit or pleasure of others.”231 Justice
Field noted that involuntary servitude had little to no judicial or
legislative exposition. So, he looked to the Civil Rights Act of 1866 for
guidance.
The theory animating the Civil Rights Act of 1866 flowed from the
Thirteenth Amendment, which enabled the Act. The Act made clear that
citizens, regardless of race or color, enjoy the same rights and privileges,
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
Id. at 59–60.
Id. at 66.
Id. at 69.
Id.
The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 90 (1873) (Field, J., dissenting).
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including “to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give
evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and
personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings for the security of persons and property.”232 To support his
conclusion that a citizen is subjected to an involuntary servitude when
denied equality in the same rights and privileges as others, Justice Field
quoted Senator Trumbull, who fervently supported the Act: “I take it that
any statute which is not equal to all, and which deprives any citizen of
civil rights, which are secured to other citizens, is an unjust
encroachment upon his liberty; and it is in fact a badge of servitude
which by the Constitution is prohibited.”233
Justice Field reasoned that the Thirteenth Amendment could reach the
state statute at issue, as it deprived the butchers of their right to use their
land to pursue the trade upon which they depended for a living, forcing
them to bear the cost of travel to a prescribed facility run by a
corporation they must pay to perform what they otherwise would do
without fee on their own property.234
The Court again considered the scope of the Thirteenth Amendment in
the Civil Rights Cases235 and, in doing so, used the words “slavery” and
“servitude” interchangeably. There, the Court considered the
constitutionality of federal indictments under the Civil Rights Act of
1875 against a number of individuals who deprived Black Americans
admittance to various theatres and a train on equal basis with white
Americans.236 The amendment, according to the Court, “has only to do
with slavery and its incidents.”237 While the Thirteenth Amendment is
self-executing in establishing “universal freedom,” it also empowers
Congress to create legislation to abolish “all badges and incidents of
slavery.”238 The Court described the badges and incidents of slavery:
Compulsory service of the slave for the benefit of the master, restraint
of his movements except by the master’s will, disability to hold
property, to make contracts, to have a standing in court, to be a witness
against a white person, and such like burdens and incapacities, were
the inseparable incidents of the institution.239

Based on this description, the Court held refusal to accommodate a
person in an inn, theatre, train, or other “matters of intercourse or
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

Id. at 91.
Id. at 91–92 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866) (emphasis added)).
Id. at 92–93.
The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
Id. at 18–19.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 20.
Id. at 22 (emphasis added).
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business” did not impose servitude or its incidents on a person.240 “Mere
discriminations on account of race or color were not regarded as badges
of slavery.”241
While the Court considered slavery and involuntary servitude to be
well-understood, the plain meaning of these terms called into question
the validity of many long-standing service contracts. In Robertson v.
Baldwin,242 the petitioner challenged as unconstitutional a federal law
authorizing the detention and punishment of any person who deserted the
ship upon which he contractually bound himself to perform a sea
voyage.243 The Court perceived a quandary posed by the Thirteenth
Amendment for the contract at issue: if servitude is “involuntary”
whenever a person no longer consents to perform, rather than voluntary
at all times with consent at the agreement’s inception, “then no one, not
even a soldier, sailor or apprentice, can surrender his liberty, even for a
day; and the soldier may desert his regiment upon the eve of battle.”244
To avoid the perceived quandary, the Court in Robertson looked past
the “letter of the Thirteenth Amendment” to its “spirit” and found the
Thirteenth Amendment did not intend to reach services “which have
from time immemorial” been treated as exceptional.245 Military
enlistments and the rights of parents to rear their children served as two
examples of the types of relationships that the Thirteenth Amendment
was not intended to disturb.246 The examples admit exceptions to the
Amendment’s “general language,” the Court reasoned, and since the
Amendment did not distinguish between public and private services,
exceptions may be found in either case.247 From ancient times to the
federal statute at issue, countries had enacted strict measures to enforce
merchant-seaman agreements, without which the safety of the ship and
240. Id. at 24–25.
241. Id. at 25. The majority opinion drew a scathing dissent by Justice John Marshall Harlan,
who opined “that such discrimination practiced by corporations and individuals in the exercise of
their public or quasi-public functions is a badge of servitude the imposition of which Congress
may prevent under its power, by appropriate legislation, to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment . . .
.” Id. at 43 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Eighty-five years later, the Court in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), adopted Justice Harlan’s reasoning in affirming the constitutionality of
42 U.S.C. § 1982, as applied to purely private transactions involving racial discrimination in the
sale of real property. The Court reasoned “Congress has the power under the Thirteenth
Amendment rationally to determine what are the badges and the incidents of slavery, and the
authority to translate that determination into effective legislation.” Jones, 392 U.S. at 440.
242. Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275 (1897).
243. Id. at 277.
244. Id. at 280.
245. Id. at 281.
246. Id. at 282.
247. Id.
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crew would greatly be compromised.248 The Court held that the
Thirteenth Amendment’s provision against involuntary servitude did not
apply to the statute, which enforced private seaman-merchant contracts
like the one under consideration.249
Similarly, the Court has held that the Thirteenth Amendment does not
impair government’s power to compel citizens to render public services.
In Butler v. Perry, the petitioner challenged a state law requiring every
able-bodied male over twenty-one years of age to work on roads and
bridges for six ten-hour days per year.250 The Court, citing the
Slaughter-House Cases and Robertson, opined that the Thirteenth
Amendment “introduced no novel doctrine with respect of services
always treated as exceptional, and certainly was not intended to interdict
enforcement of those duties which individuals owe to the State, such as
services in the army, militia, on the jury, etc.”251 State conscription for
public works could be traced back to colonial times.252 The Court
overruled the Thirteenth Amendment challenge. In so doing, the Court
noted the Thirteenth Amendment’s great purpose: “liberty under the
protection of effective government, not the destruction of the latter by
depriving it of essential powers.”253
Subsequently, in the Selective Draft Law Cases, the Court affirmed
compulsory military service against a Thirteenth Amendment
challenge.254 The Court reasoned:
[A]s we are unable to conceive upon what theory the exaction by
government from the citizen of the performance of his supreme and
noble duty of contributing to the defense of the rights and honor of the
nation, as the result of a war declared by the great representative body
of the people, can be said to be the imposition of involuntary servitude
in violation of the prohibitions of the Thirteenth Amendment, we are
constrained to the conclusion that the contention to that effect is refuted
by its mere statement.255

The extratextual exception to the Thirteenth Amendment proffered by
the Court in Butler, the Selective Draft Law Cases, and others has been
coined the “civic-duty exception.”256 However, the line of cases here
248. Id. at 282–87 (tracing the history of merchant-seaman agreements).
249. Id. at 287–88.
250. Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 329–30 (1916).
251. Id. at 333.
252. Id. at 331–32.
253. Id. at 333.
254. The Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 390 (1918).
255. Id.
256. Novoa v. GEO Grp., Inc., No. EDCV 17-2514, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117129, at *37–38
(C.D. Cal. June 21, 2018).
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appears to focus, as Butler emphasized, on the essential powers of
government that render it effective, without which liberty would be
impossible.
Courts have made no constitutionally significant distinction between
slavery and involuntary servitude. Though noting the latter is
conceptually broader than the former, both words as used in the
Thirteenth Amendment have been construed to cover all shades and
conditions of compulsory service of a free person against her will and
consent. With respect to the express exception, courts apply it as written
without much explanation: a valid criminal conviction takes
incarceration of a person and involuntary labor pursuant to sentence of
punishment, or in accordance with institutional rules, outside the
Thirteenth Amendment’s reach.257
III. THE MEANING AND LEGAL EFFECT OF THE THIRTEENTH
AMENDMENT’S EXCEPTION
The legislative history behind the Thirteenth Amendment’s exception
and the judicial interpretations of the words “slavery” and “involuntary
servitude” illuminate the meaning and scope of the exception and the
amendment itself. The Thirteenth Amendment establishes “universal

257. See Ray v. Mabry, 556 F.2d 881, 882 (8th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (“Compelling prison
inmates to work does not contravene the Thirteenth Amendment.”); Omasta v. Wainwright, 696
F.2d 1304, 1305 (11th Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (“We . . . hold that where a prisoner is incarcerated
pursuant to a presumptively valid judgment and commitment order issued by a court of competent
jurisdiction and is forced to work pursuant to prison regulations or state statutes, the [T]hirteenth
[A]mendment’s prohibition against involuntary servitude is not implicated.”); Wendt v. Lynaugh,
841 F.2d 619, 620–21 (5th Cir. 1988) (dismissing as frivolous civil suit by a former prisoner
seeking backpay for compulsory work without pay in prison, and finding that the plaintiff had been
duly convicted of a crime and serving punishment in prison for that crime, invalidating his
involuntary servitude claim under the Thirteenth Amendment’s exception); United States ex rel.
Smith v. Dowd, 271 F.2d 292, 295 (7th Cir. 1959) (holding life imprisonment as punishment under
habitual offender statute did not violate the Thirteenth Amendment, and noting “[s]uch penalty is
imposed as an incident to a conviction of crime and in our opinion is punishment for crime
excepted from the prohibition of the Thirteenth Amendment”); Draper v. Rhay, 315 F.2d 193, 197
(9th Cir. 1963) (“Where a person is duly tried, convicted, sentenced and imprisoned for crime in
accordance with law, no issue of peonage or involuntary servitude arises. . . . The Thirteenth
Amendment has no application where a person is held to answer for a violation of a penal
statute. . . . It follows, therefore, that whether appellant is being held in the state penitentiary or the
county jail, he may be required to work in accordance with institution rules.”); Hill v. Ariz. Dep’t
of Corr., No. CV 19-05693, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11059, at *14 n.10 (D. Ariz. Jan. 21, 2021)
(“Incarceration pursuant to a valid conviction does not violate the Thirteenth Amendment.”);
Cannon v. Hull, No. 1:16cv359, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95581, at *10–11 (E.D. Va. July 21, 2016)
(dismissing prisoner’s claim that being forced to wear handcuffs and shackles while showering
violates Thirteenth Amendment); Blass v. Weigel, 85 F. Supp. 775, 781 (D. N.J. 1949) (“The
Thirteenth Amendment has no application to a situation where a person is held to answer for
violations of a penal statute.”).
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civil and political freedom throughout the United States.”258 On its face,
the amendment articulates that freedom is the baseline condition of every
person within the jurisdiction of the United States.
Universal civil and political freedom proved difficult to articulate.
Congress wrestled with overreaching; making freedom the human
baseline threatened to upend too many existing social, political, and
economic relationships and to undermine the many involuntary or
otherwise coerced means by which government may constrain a person’s
freedom. Congress chose unfortunate words to describe the exception,
stating that a person in the United States may be subject to “slavery” or
“involuntary servitude” if duly convicted of a crime.
This article argues the exception cannot be read to reestablish statusbased servitude, specifically with respect to citizens, for status-based
servitude was exactly what the Thirteenth Amendment sought to end.
Before setting forth the argument, though, it is necessary to identify
some interpretive guidelines. The Slaughter-House Cases provide the
interpretive account necessary here.
A. The Reconstruction Amendments Embody a “Unity of Purpose.”
The Thirteenth Amendment plays an indispensable role in defining
and enforcing American freedom. The amendment embraces the selfevident truth announced in the Declaration of Independence that we “are
created equal” and endowed with “unalienable rights,” which include the
rights to “Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness,” and that
governments are formed, “deriving their just powers from the consent of
the governed,” to secure these rights.259 Yet the Thirteenth Amendment
was only the first of three amendments aimed at ending the vestiges of
slavery and its burdens and incidents in the United States. While each
Reconstruction amendment serves a distinct purpose on its own, the
amendments embody a “unity of purpose” that stems from their
history.260
A brief sketch of the unity of purpose underlying the Reconstruction
amendments will aid the discussion in this section. Reconstruction
258. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883).
259. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776); see also CONG. GLOBE, 38th
Cong., 2d Sess. 142 (1865) (“The effect of such amendment will be to prohibit slavery in these
United States, and be a practical application of that self-evident truth, ‘that all men are created
equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that among these, are
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”).
260. See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 67 (1873) (“The most cursory
glance at these articles discloses a unity of purpose, when taken in connection with the history of
the times, which cannot fail to have an important bearing on any question of doubt concerning
their true meaning.”).
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legislators at the outset envisioned civil and political equality for Black
Americans in every state. Once the requisite states ratified the Thirteenth
Amendment, Congress immediately passed the Civil Rights Act of 1866,
which included a definition of citizenship. Southern states, however,
continued to diminish the rights afforded Black Americans, treating them
as if they were still under a condition of bondage, notwithstanding their
status as free.261
Congress then took the next step to provide more robust and
unquestionable protections to Black Americans by proposing the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Citizenship Clause in the Fourteenth
Amendment tracked the definition in the Civil Rights Act of 1866.
However, southern states continued to infringe on Black Americans’
rights by employing Black Codes. In response, and as the Fourteenth
Amendment worked its way through the ratification process, Congress
passed the Reconstruction Act of 1867, which placed southern states
under military rule and required these states, as a condition to
unoccupied readmission to the Union, to ratify the Fourteenth
Amendment and enfranchise all adult males, including Black men,
except for participation in rebellion or felony at common law.262
The Slaughter-House Cases best sums up Congress’ next step:
A few years’ experience satisfied those thoughtful men who had been
the authors of the other two amendments that, notwithstanding the
restraints of those articles on the States, and the laws passed under the
additional powers granted to Congress, these were inadequate for the
protection of life, liberty, and property, without which freedom to the
slave was no boon. They were in all those States denied the right of
suffrage. The laws were administered by white man alone. It was urged
that a race of men distinctively marked as was the negro, living in the
261. Id. at 67–71.
262. Id.; see also Chin, supra note 45, at 270–71 (noting that military occupation of southern
states was specifically authorized in Congress’ readmission acts enacted before drafting the
Fourteenth Amendment). Notably, Representative Thaddeus Stevens unsuccessfully tried to limit
disenfranchisement under the Reconstruction Act to “treason or misprision of treason,” providing
the following reasons:
I have received information from gentlemen connected with the Freedman’s Bureau—I
knew it for weeks past, but only yesterday received the information officially—that in
North Carolina and other States where punishment at the whipping-post deprives the
person of the right to vote, they are now every day whipping negroes for a thousand and
one trivial offenses; and one of the lieutenants now there . . . told me . . . that they are
taking them up in the different counties, and in one county before he left they had
whipped every adult male negro whom they knew of. They were all convicted and
sentenced at once, and he ascertained by intermingling with the people that it was for
the purpose of preventing these negroes from voting under the bills which have been
passed.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 324 (1867).
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midst of another dominant race, could never be fully secured in their
person and their property without the right of suffrage.263

Thus, Congress proposed and the states ratified the Fifteenth
Amendment.
The “unity of purpose” reveals an intimate relationship between
freedom, citizenship, and the franchise. As the Court admonished in the
Slaughter-House Cases, courts must repair to that unity of purpose to
“safely and rationally” resolve any doubts that arise as to the meaning or
scope of any one of the Reconstruction amendments.264 Though the
Court in the Slaughter-House Cases recognized the unity of purpose to
“mean the freedom of the slave race, the security and firm establishment
of that freedom, and the protection of the newly-made freeman and
citizen from the oppressions of those who had formerly exercised
unlimited dominion over him,” the Reconstruction amendments apply to
all persons, regardless of race.265 As a result, this article untethers race
from the unity of purpose in the analysis that follows.
B. The Exception Affirms Government Penal Power and Acknowledges
the Restraint of Freedom It Imposes on a Convict.
Constitutional interpretation issues may at times frustrate efforts to
resolve pressing societal ills, to remediate severe civil rights violations,
or to restrain abusive government practices, with competing theories of
interpretation or adjudication distracting from, and thereby obscuring,
the real-world issue at hand. This article does not compare competing
interpretive theories, for example between various strands of originalism,
or between originalism and living constitutionalism. The Supreme Court
announced a model to interpret the linguistic meaning of text in any
given Reconstruction amendment and to ascertain the text’s legal effect.
This article employs the “unity of purpose” that the Reconstruction
amendments embody, while also looking to the specific purpose
underlying the Thirteenth Amendment, legislative history regarding the
Thirteenth Amendment’s exception, judicial interpretations of the
Thirteenth Amendment, and present jurisprudence concerning prisoners’
rights.
At the outset, though, it is important to note that a different
interpretive model may yield an entirely different result than the one
offered here, with dire consequences that bear on the criminal
disenfranchisement issue, as will be discussed in the next section. As an

263. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 71.
264. Id. at 67.
265. Id. at 71.
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example, Scott W. Howe details the brutalities to which prisoners were
subject via convict leasing programs, chain gangs, and other labor
exploitation practices in southern states prior to the Thirteenth
Amendment’s drafting and after the Thirteenth Amendment was ratified.
He concludes that these long-unabated practices “support[] the
conclusion that the original public meaning for the Thirteenth
Amendment was to permit slavery as a punishment for crime despite the
main prohibition on slavery.”266 If slavery as then understood may be
imposed as punishment, then crime-based disenfranchisement easily
finds sanction in the Thirteenth Amendment’s exception; a slave was
historically outside the body politic.
The Thirteenth Amendment’s underlying purpose provides a good
starting point to inquire about its meaning as a whole. Its underlying
purpose is “liberty under the protection of effective government.”267 As
Jacobus tenBroek explains, the “slavery” abolished by the Thirteenth
Amendment included:
the involuntary personal servitude of the bondman; the denial to the
[B]lacks, bond and free, of their natural rights through the failure of the
government to protect them and to protect them equally; the denial to
the whites of their natural and constitutional rights through a similar
failure of government. Stated affirmatively, and in the alternative
phrases and concepts used repeatedly throughout the debates, the
Thirteenth Amendment would: first, guarantee the equal protection of
the laws to men in their natural and to citizens in their constitutional
rights; and/or, second, safeguard citizens of the United States equally in
their constitutional privileges and immunities; and/or, running a bad
but nevertheless articulated third, enforce the constitutional guarantee
to all persons against deprivation of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law.268

The two components, liberty and effective government, must be
accorded equal weight when ascertaining the Thirteenth Amendment’s
meaning as a whole.
The express exception to the Thirteenth Amendment should be read in
light of the reality (the fact of the matter) of what punishment as a result
of lawful criminal conviction imposes on a person—restraint of
freedom—and as affirming government power to so restrain a person
upon lawful conviction. It cannot be read to reinstitute status-based
slavery. The reading offered here finds support in legislative history
266. Howe, supra note 214, at 1018.
267. Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 333 (1916).
268. Jacobus tenBroek, Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States:
Consummation to Abolition and Key to the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 CALIF. L. REV. 171, 180–
81 (1951).
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surrounding the express exception, and in the court-created civic-duty
exception. This reading also best coheres with the unity of purpose
underlying the Reconstruction amendments and present jurisprudence
concerning prisoners’ rights and citizenship.
The resolution by the House of Representatives to disambiguate the
Thirteenth Amendment’s exception is most telling here. As the
resolution read, the exception did not allow a return to chattel slavery
and expressly prohibited the imposition of punishment by private actors,
notwithstanding a court conviction. The only servitude recognized by the
Thirteenth Amendment, according to the resolution, would be
“imprisonment or other restraint of freedom under the immediate control
of officers of the law . . . to the exclusion of all unofficial control of the
person so held in servitude.”269 The notion that a conviction could lead
to one being sold to another individual, and punishment meted out by
private hands smacked too much of status-based servitude, as it placed a
person under the dominion of another individual, which is exactly what
the Black Codes aimed to achieve—the total re-enslavement of Black
Americans. House Republicans approved the resolution,270 which made
clear that the Thirteenth Amendment’s exception could not be construed
to reintroduce chattel slavery in any form or appearance.
A pragmatic rationale may be teased out of the House resolution.
Representative Kasson supported the resolution by providing
imprisonment and sentence to hard labor as examples of the slavery or
involuntary servitude to which the exception refers, and he emphasized
that these punishments are served in a state prison “in the regular and
ordinary course of law.”271 A sentence to imprisonment and hard labor
enforced by government is undoubtedly a restraint on freedom, which is
imposed on a person without regard to whether she volunteers to serve
the sentence, yet no one denied the power of government to impose
punishment pursuant to lawful conviction. The House resolution may be
understood to construe the Thirteenth Amendment’s exception to do no
more than affirm government’s existing penal power and acknowledge
the obvious restraint on freedom imposed on a convict when government
exercises that power. Though the Senate never voted on the resolution,
its passage in the House provides insight into how Reconstruction
Republicans understood the Thirteenth Amendment’s exception.
State penal power falls within the purview of essential government
powers the Thirteenth Amendment did not intend to interdict. The
269. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 344 (1867).
270. Id. at 348.
271. Id. at 345–46.
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United States Supreme Court reined in the seemingly broad reach the
Thirteenth Amendment’s plain language implied. For the language
prohibited involuntary servitude, whether imposed by government or
private actors. In order to effectively govern and protect citizens in their
constitutional privileges and immunities, the Court construed the
Thirteenth Amendment to not deny government its essential powers, like
the power to conscript citizens for the nation’s defense. The exception to
the Thirteenth Amendment supports the Court-invoked “spirit” of the
Amendment by providing an express example of a long-standing
essential power of government that the amendment did not intend to
disturb—penal power. Without penal power, government could not
effectively safeguard persons and citizens in their constitutional
privileges and immunities by creating uniform practices that advance
legitimate penal aims, such as vindicating victim’s rights and deterring
criminal conduct in society.
The Thirteenth Amendment’s exception cannot be read to reinstitute
status-based slavery. Status-based slavery was one of the primary evils
the Reconstruction amendments sought to abate. Status-based slavery
also does not accord with present jurisprudence concerning prisoners’
rights.
In Scott v. Sanford (“Dred Scott”), the United States Supreme Court
held that descendants of slaves, even if emancipated, were not and could
never be United States citizens.272 According to the Court, Congress
lacked constitutional power to declare slaves free.273 Each state
possessed the right to determine the intrastate, but not interstate, status of
descendants of Africans as either free or slave.274 The Court offered
stark reasoning throughout the opinion, for example:
They had for more than a century before been regarded as beings of an
inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white race,
either in social or political relations; and so far inferior, that they had
no rights which the white man was bound to respect; and that the negro
might just and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his benefit. He was
bought and sold, and treated as ordinary article of merchandise and
traffic, whenever a profit could be made by it. This opinion was at that
time fixed and universal in the civilized portion of the white race. It
was regarded as an axiom in morals as well as in politics, which no one
thought of disputing, or supposed to be open to dispute . . . . 275
272. See Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 453–54 (1857) (concluding the federal courts had no
jurisdiction to hear Scott’s case because the Missouri Supreme Court had determined Scott and his
family were enslaved persons without citizenship).
273. Id. at 464.
274. Id. at 449–50.
275. Id. at 407.
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While a given state might recognize descendants of Africans as free
and not slave, even conferring upon such persons all the rights and
privileges of citizenship within that state, no other state was bound to
recognize that status, according to Dred Scott.276
The Thirteenth Amendment specifically upended the Dred Scott
decision as it pertained to the status of every person within the
jurisdiction of the United States and its territories. The amendment
openly rejected Dred Scott’s holding that the federal government lacked
power to prohibit slavery and involuntary servitude, thereby rejecting the
notion that states had the sole right to declare a person free or slave
within their own borders. Similarly, the amendment rejected the notion
that Black Americans were tainted by a badge of inferiority that
excluded them and their descendants from membership in the national
polity.
Although the Thirteenth Amendment did not expressly address
citizenship, the framers of the Thirteenth Amendment believed the
federal government reserved the power to decide the issue of national
citizenship.277 The drafters saw the amendment as “not just cutting loose
the fetters which bound the physical person of the slave[,] but restoring
to him his natural, inalienable and civil rights; or what was the same
thing in other words, guaranteeing to him the privileges and immunities
of citizens of the United States.”278 The Civil Rights Act of 1866
declared birthright citizenship, conferring citizenship status on every free
person born within the United States.
Unfortunately, the Civil Rights Act of 1866 stood on shaky ground, as
the Act itself met great opposition and was enacted only by a legislative
override of President Andrew Johnson’s veto.279 Moreover, the
exception in the Thirteenth Amendment introduced doubt as to whether
slavery was completely abolished in every form. The Fourteenth
Amendment resolved any remaining doubt as to the citizenship issue
and, thereby, as to whether the Thirteenth Amendment’s exception
276. Id. at 461–62.
277. See, e.g., FONER, supra note 185, at 63–64 (noting that congressmen viewed the
Thirteenth Amendment as empowering Congress and the courts to protect Americans’ liberties);
ALEXANDER TSESIS, THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT AND AMERICAN FREEDOM: A LEGAL
HISTORY 55–56 (2004) (noting that in its original form the Civil Rights Act proposed to confer
citizenship on all persons, except untaxed Indians who inhabited states or territories); tenBroek,
supra note 268, at 190–92, 195–96, n.45 (claiming it was the framers’ intention to secure the
natural rights of men specified in the Declaration of Independence).
278. tenBroek, supra note 268, at 200.
279. See, e.g., FONER, supra note 185, at 56 (noting the Republican two-thirds majority in both
houses of Congress that allowed for the Fourteenth Amendment to be passed over presidential
veto).
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reestablished status-based servitude.
To place the citizenship issue beyond dispute, the Fourteenth
Amendment declares, “All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside.”280 This simple but sweeping
declaration completely abolished any remaining remnant of status-based
servitude for which the Dred Scott opinion stood. A person’s citizenship
status was no longer tied to her previous condition of servitude, no
longer tied to her race, and no longer tied to her ancestors’ status as
either free or slave. And, under present citizenship jurisprudence, a
person remains a United States citizen unless she voluntarily expatriates
herself; criminal conviction alone does not amount to a forfeiture of
citizenship status.
The continuity of intent shown here between the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendment in dismantling any semblance of status-based
slavery accords with the “unity of purpose” underlying the
Reconstruction amendments—freedom for all, security and
establishment of that freedom, and protection of free persons and citizens
from “unlimited dominion.”281 The Fifteenth Amendment was the final
stamp against status-based slavery, against the notion that society may
impose on a person slavery and its burdens and incidents—the taint of
servitude that encumbered a person wherever she went according to
Dred Scott. The Fifteenth Amendment stamped out race, color, and
“previous condition of servitude” as disqualifying factors to a citizen’s
right to vote.282 In so doing, the Fifteenth Amendment dealt the final
blow to status-based slavery by announcing that no person carried with
her the taint of the old slave system and its ideology but instead stood on
an equal footing with every other citizen in the polity.
As a citizen, a person imprisoned by sentence for duly convicted
crime does not don the status of a slave or servant. Imprisonment might
resemble the condition of slavery in many ways: “Discipline,
subordination, unpaid labor, restricted choices, circumscribed movement,
limited contact, possibility of physical disciplining, and so on . . . .”283
Yet, as a citizen, and unlike a slave, a prisoner does not lose all the
privileges, immunities, and rights of citizenship. As the Supreme Court
explained in Wolff v. McDonnell:

280. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
281. See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 71 (1873) (describing the “one
pervading purpose” underlying the Reconstruction amendments in their historical context).
282. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
283. TRIPKOVIĆ, supra note 16, at 103.
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Lawful imprisonment necessarily makes unavailable many rights and
privileges of the ordinary citizen a “retraction justified by the
considerations underlying our penal system.” But though his rights may
be diminished by the needs and exigencies of the institutional
environment, a prisoner is not wholly stripped of constitutional
protections when he is imprisoned for crime. There is no iron curtain
drawn between the Constitution and the prisoners of this country.
Prisoners have been held to enjoy substantial religious freedom under
the First and Fourteenth Amendments. They retain right of access to
the courts. Prisoners are protected under the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment from invidious discrimination based on
race. Prisoners may also claim the protections of the Due Process
Clause. They may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law.284

A person’s citizenship status is appreciably qualified when subject to
punishment that flows from a criminal conviction, but she does not lose
her status as a citizen altogether as a result of a criminal conviction
alone. Nor does she lose all citizenship rights and entitlements as a result
of a criminal conviction alone.
A fair, and perhaps the best, reading of the Thirteenth Amendment’s
exception, then, is that it merely acknowledges government penal power
and the necessary restraint of freedom it imposes on a convict. Under no
circumstances may the Thirteenth Amendment or its exception be
construed to impose status-based slavery on any citizen.
Armed with a fair and plausible reading of the Thirteenth
Amendment, this article returns to the criminal-disenfranchisement
debate. How, if at all, does the Thirteenth Amendment inform it?
IV. CRIMINAL DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT
Criminal disenfranchisement is without question a serious
encroachment on a citizen’s fundamental rights. Richardson v. Ramirez
looked to a single provision within the Fourteenth Amendment to hold as
constitutional permanent disenfranchisement for criminal conviction.
The Thirteenth Amendment has not substantially factored into the
scholarly discussion nor informed any legal challenges to criminal
disenfranchisement. Such an omission is incredible, for the amendment
(exception and all) is crucial to the primary arguments against blanket
criminal disenfranchisement. This section outlines a few ways in which
the Thirteenth Amendment informs the debate.

284. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555–56 (1974) (quoting Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S.
266, 285 (1948)).
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A. Criminal Disenfranchisement and Citizenship
If courts and Congress take seriously the fundamental connection
between citizenship and the franchise, then the primary issue that
criminal disenfranchisement raises is whether a criminal conviction for
any crime whatsoever is sufficient to sever the connection between
citizenship and the franchise, either temporarily or permanently. This
issue invokes the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and
is greatly informed by the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.
Start with the premise that the right to vote is a fundamental feature of
citizenship in the United States. This premise finds support in the unity
of purpose described above; the franchise was the final and necessary
step following freedom and citizenship to ensure Black Americans could
be “fully secured in their person and property.” The premise also finds
ample support in case law.285
Additional support, if necessary, may be found in the opening words
to the Fifteenth Amendment and every voting-rights amendment
thereafter. These amendments each open with “[t]he Right of Citizens to
Vote.” While it may be tempting to dismiss the opening words to the
Fifteenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-Fourth, and Twenty-Sixth Amendments
as only prefaces to what a state may not consider in voter qualifications,
it is telling that each of these amendments affirmatively rejected prior
legislative exclusions and judicial determinations, and, in effect, the
theoretical bases upon which they relied. Women’s right to vote provides
an apt example. Many Reconstruction legislators did not envision the
Reconstruction amendments to extend full equality to women.286
Likewise, the Court in Minor v. Happersett held that a woman, though a
citizen, was not entitled to vote based on citizenship status alone because
long-standing practices among states excluded women from the
franchise.287 The Nineteenth Amendment is a clear rejection of past
285. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972) (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533, 562 (1964) (“By denying some citizens the right to vote, such laws deprive them of ‘a
fundamental political right, . . . preservative of all rights.’ . . . In decision after decision, this Court
has made clear that a citizen has a constitutionally protected right to participate in elections on an
equal basis with other citizens in the jurisdiction.”)); McLaughlin v. City of Canton, 947 F. Supp.
954, 971 (S.D. Miss. 1995) (“[T]he disenfranchised is severed from the body politic and
condemned to the lowest form of citizenship . . . .”).
286. See, e.g., FONER, supra note 185, at 81–83, 115 (noting that legislators intentionally used
the word “male” in the Fourteenth Amendment, where Senator Charles Sumner indicated that
female suffrage was a question for the future, while others relied on differences between males and
females to justify barring women from suffrage); Nina Morais, Sex Discrimination and the
Fourteenth Amendment: Lost History, 97 YALE L.J. 1153, 1159 (1988) (arguing the framers had an
overriding interest in prohibiting racial discrimination but had no awareness that the amendment
might be applied to sex discrimination).
287. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 175–76 (1874) (discussing Section 2 of the Fourteenth
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grounds asserted against women’s equality and a rejection of the Court’s
inegalitarian holding that citizenship does not include the right to
vote.288 As a final point, if the Supreme Court is willing to entertain an
exemption to the representation-reduction penalty in Section 2 of the
Fourteenth Amendment as proof that the exemption states an affirmative
sanction of criminal disenfranchisement, then surely the Court could take
seriously that “The Right of Citizens to Vote” affirms that citizenship
includes the right to vote, the people having announced it five times by
constitutional amendment.289
The Supreme Court in Afroyim v. Rusk interpreted the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Citizenship Clause to vest each citizen with an
unconditional right to remain a citizen—a right only the citizen may
voluntarily relinquish.290 In Afroyim, the Court reasoned that a plain
reading of the Citizenship Clause makes evident that, “[o]nce acquired,
this Fourteenth Amendment citizenship was not to be shifted, canceled,
or diluted at the will of the Federal Government, the States, or any other
governmental unit.”291 The unity of purpose described above supports
the Afroyim Court’s reasoning here, as a primary objective of the
Citizenship Clause was permanently to secure Black Americans’
citizenship, which the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment feared
could not be achieved by statute alone under Thirteenth Amendment
enforcement power, as a statute lacked the supermajority protection an
amendment afforded.
The Thirteenth Amendment is implicated here. The framers of the
Thirteenth Amendment considered freedom a sufficient basis to confer
citizenship on Black Americans, as Dred Scott reasoned, in part, that
one’s status as free was a necessary condition to citizenship. Freedom
and citizenship were considered inseparably linked in this regard. A free
person was one capable of self-governance and possessing requisite
agency to consent to be governed within a polity.
The Thirteenth Amendment’s exception cannot be read to render a
Amendment in support of the Court’s holding, which included a reference to “men,” but not
women, with respect to “the right to vote”).
288. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.”); Ely, supra note 45, at
1190–91 (“[T]he Nineteenth Amendment repealed that part of Section 2 that adverted to the denial
of the franchise to women.”).
289. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (marking the first time the “right to vote” was referenced in
the Constitution and tied, in part, to citizenship, with the right to vote mentioned in four
subsequent amendments tied solely to a person’s status as citizen: “The Right of Citizens to
Vote”).
290. Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 262 (1967) (determining Congress has no general power
to revoke American citizenship without consent).
291. Id. (emphasis added).
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citizen wholly unfree or under unlimited dominion by a state or the
federal government as punishment for crime. There is no historical
evidence to suggest that the Thirteenth Amendment’s framers intended
newly freed slaves to be permanently stripped of their freedom for any
criminal conviction. The restraint on freedom imposed by a criminal
sentence extends only so far in degree and duration as the sentence may
legally allow and no more. If the restraint on freedom extended beyond
the sentence, the criminal conviction would impose status-based
servitude. The Thirteenth Amendment permanently abolished statusbased servitude without exception, and the Fifteenth Amendment
affirmatively rejected status-based servitude when it stamped out
“previous condition of servitude” as a disqualifying factor to a citizen’s
right to vote. This signaled, as argued above, that no person carried with
her the taint of the old slave system and its ideology, but stood on an
equal footing with every other citizen in the polity.
The Citizenship Clause analysis provides a workable approach to
criminal disenfranchisement challenges, and the analysis directly
addresses the real issue at hand in such challenges: if the right to vote is
a fundamental feature of citizenship, then under what conditions may
government shift, cancel, or dilute that right? Although the right to
remain a citizen absent voluntary relinquishment is absolute, a person
may be expatriated for committing proscribed acts so long as the
government proves both that the person committed the act and intended
to relinquish her citizenship.292 Most, if not all, of the acts Congress
historically considered sufficient to expatriate a person directly
compromised the person’s allegiance to the United States; these included
taking an oath of allegiance to a foreign country, serving in a foreign
country’s military in an armed conflict against the United States,
committing treason, or attempting to overthrow the United States by
force.293 Even when a person commits an act as serious as treason or an
attempt to overthrow the government by force, expatriation is not
automatic. The government must still separately show that the person
292. Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 270 (1980).
293. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (providing the acts which can expatriate a person if coupled
with the requisite intent to relinquish citizenship); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)
(plurality opinion) (holding that a statute expatriating a person convicted of military desertion by
court martial constituted cruel and unusual punishment); Vance, 444 U.S. at 270 (holding that the
government must show both intent to relinquish citizenship and the voluntary commission of an
expatriating act before an individual is expatriated). Richard M. Re and Christopher M. Re point
out that Congress had passed the Thirteenth Amendment one month before passing the Federal
Deserter Act, which deemed Civil War deserters had “‘voluntarily relinquished and forfeited their
rights of citizenship,’ including the right to vote.” Re & Re, supra note 45, at 1601 (quoting Act of
Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 79, 13 Stat. 487, 490).
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intended voluntarily to relinquish her citizenship, giving up all attendant
citizenship rights.
The Richardson Court did not repair to the unity of purpose
underlying the Reconstruction amendments, as admonished in the
Slaughter-House Cases, to safely and rationally resolve those doubts
about the meaning, scope, and application of the exemption in Section 2
of the Fourteenth Amendment when the constitutionality of criminal
disenfranchisement was challenged. There are two main issues:
What crimes, if any, may a state legitimately deem worthy to sanction
a citizen with disenfranchisement?
How long may a state legitimately disenfranchise a person for
committing a specific crime?
Reconstruction Republicans generally believed a state had a right to
disenfranchise felons.294 Some consensus existed among them that
felonies at common law and treason were crimes worthy of
disenfranchisement. There was no clear general consensus among them
regarding how long such disenfranchisement should last for commission
of “other crime.” The only discussion, in fact, expressly regarding
permanent disenfranchisement centered on Confederate soldiers for
participating in the rebellion.295 The historical practices of states alone
could not resolve these questions, especially considering that the longstanding historical practices among states of failing to protect Black
Americans animated the rights and protections afforded by the
Reconstruction amendments.
Future legal challenges to criminal disenfranchisement should invoke
the unity of purpose underlying the Reconstruction amendments. The
Thirteenth Amendment plays a vital role, as vital as the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments, in safely and rationally answering the issue
raised here: Is a criminal conviction for any crime whatsoever sufficient
temporarily or permanently to sever the connection between citizenship
294. FONER, supra note 185, at 110 (explaining that congressional Republicans agreed that
states could disenfranchise felons). See generally Re & Re, supra note 45, at 1593–97 (providing
historical account of general belief held by many Reconstruction Republicans regarding formal
equality—equal treatment for equal acts—informed by a social contractarian view that a criminal
offender forfeits self-rule and, thereby, political rights).
295. The quote by Ohio Representative Ephraim R. Eckley relied on by the Richardson
majority was part of Representative Eckley’s argument that Southern rebels committed treason, an
act “against the nation, against the whole people—the highest known to the law.” CONG. GLOBE,
39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2535 (1866). He objected to a limited punishment in Section 3 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, stating, “I would disenfranchise them forever.” Id. Like Representative
Eckley, Representative (later President) James A. Garfield stated: “[I]f the gentlemen who report
this bill will put in a section, that all who participated in the rebellion shall forever be excluded
from the right of elective franchise, in all cases relating to national offices, then I will say the
proposition will be just and one we could stand upon as a matter of principle.” Id. at 2463.
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and the franchise? If the right to vote is a fundamental feature of
citizenship, then the Citizenship Clause should have some bearing on the
circumstances under which a state may temporarily or permanently sever
that connection. The crimes or acts typically deemed worthy of
expatriation compromise one’s allegiance to the United States; they are
acts that manifest a fundamental antipathy toward correlative duties that
flow from one’s status as a citizen, the kind of duties a government may
exact without imposing involuntary servitude.
To more fully flesh out the Thirteenth Amendment’s role in the felony
disenfranchisement debate, this article turns to the question: Does
criminal disenfranchisement constitute punishment or something else?
B. Crime, Punishment, and the Condition of Servitude
The Thirteenth Amendment also informs the debate over whether
felony disenfranchisement constitutes punishment or something else and
the implications that follow a designation one way or another. The
Thirteenth Amendment, by a plain language reading, places a person
under the most extreme condition known to the United States
Constitution, using the words “slavery” and “involuntary servitude” to
describe punishment for conviction of crime. In doing so, the
Amendment also describes the only remaining legal condition of
servitude in this country. A sentence does not impose the status of
slavery on any citizen. Once a citizen completes her sentence, she is no
longer under a condition of servitude. Under this line of reasoning, if
criminal disenfranchisement constitutes punishment, the encumbrance
may not exceed the duration of a person’s sentence. However, if the
practice constitutes a nonpenal sanction, then the questions raised above
and addressed below regarding the circumstances under which a state
may legitimately sever the connection between citizenship and the
franchise arise.
The United States Supreme Court has never expressly held that
criminal disenfranchisement constitutes punishment. In dictum, the
Court suggested that the practice constituted a nonpenal sanction.296
Lower courts sometimes explain criminal disenfranchisement as a
nonpenal sanction, sometimes as punishment, and sometimes as rooted
in criminal law but not necessarily penal.297 Strong evidence suggests
that Reconstruction legislators may have viewed the practice as penal in
nature.
296. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 96 (1958) (plurality opinion) (“[A] statute has been considered nonpenal if it imposes a disability, not to punish, but to accomplish some other legitimate
governmental purpose.”).
297. See cases cited supra notes 90–91 and accompanying text.
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To the extent criminal disenfranchisement constitutes punishment for
the crime committed, it must be limited in duration to the sentence terms.
Litigants and scholars focus on the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and
unusual punishment prohibition as a limit to criminal
disenfranchisement. But the Thirteenth Amendment also bears on this
issue. The Thirteenth Amendment’s exception has been read to impose
as punishment the most extreme condition known to the legal system in
the United States—slavery.298 Under such a reading, hardly anything
else would qualify as cruel and unusual, disenfranchisement being no
exception, given the dehumanizing and brutal nature of the institution of
slavery and the permanent taint it imposed on a person. The reading
offered in this article, however, avoids such a harsh result. Once a person
is no longer under official control and has served her sentence, she is
untainted by any condition of servitude; that is, the condition of servitude
does not permanently encumber a person or her status as an equal
member in society. If the encumbrance were permanent or extended
indefinitely past the satisfied sentence terms, then the punishment would
impose a status-based servitude, treating the person as permanently
tainted by her conviction, thereby denying her the full breadth of liberty
and self-governance enjoyed by other citizens.
Even if criminal disenfranchisement did not constitute punishment,
the permanent taint problem undermines the practice as a nonpenal
sanction for previous criminal conviction. The Fifteenth Amendment is
instructive here. As the Court reasoned in the Slaughter-House Cases,
Congress proposed the Fifteenth Amendment to provide Black
Americans with the requisite power—equal political voice—to fully
secure themselves and their property as they were “distinctively marked”
and “living in the midst of another dominant race.” The franchise
provided some safeguard against “unlimited dominion.”
Congress initially considered a positive Fifteenth Amendment that
extended the right to vote to all male citizens, adding an exception for
conviction of “treason, felony, or other infamous crime.”299 The words
Congress chose, though, omitted an express exception for criminal
convictions but did include what might be read as a reference to criminal
convictions among its list of reasons that could not disqualify a citizen
from the franchise—“previous condition of servitude.”300 While the
reference to “previous condition of servitude” may have been intended to
298. Howe, supra note 214, at 992–96 (explaining the congressional debate over the Thirteenth
Amendment and legislators’ understanding of the punishment provision).
299. Re & Re, supra note 45, at 1630–41 (explaining the affirmative (positive) and negative
approaches Republicans offered to Congress for the Fifteenth Amendment).
300. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.

2021]

The Slavery Clause and Criminal Disenfranchisement

153

make clear that a state could not deny a person the franchise based on the
fact that she or her ancestors used to be slaves, the Thirteenth
Amendment made clear reference to another condition of servitude in its
exception, as punishment for crime.301
The practical and theoretical importance of the Thirteenth
Amendment’s exception here cannot be overstated. The Thirteenth
Amendment placed every person in the United States on an equal
footing; every person is considered free, regardless of race, and every
person is equally subject to a condition of servitude, regardless of race,
for punishment of crime. When a person completes her sentence, she is
no longer under a condition of servitude; she is untainted by her previous
condition of servitude and on an equal footing with every other citizen in
the polity. Even as a nonpenal sanction, a state cannot extend
disenfranchisement beyond the sentence without imbuing the citizen
with that previous condition. The problem is not only that the state
adjudges the citizen as morally and politically irredeemable, but also that
the state reintroduces the worst aspects of the former slave system, which
treated even freed slaves as incapable and unworthy of self-governance.
The Fifteenth Amendment prohibits a state from disenfranchising a
citizen based on “previous condition of servitude.” George Fletcher has
argued the Fifteenth Amendment may be read to prohibit states from
disenfranchising felons “simply because they were subject to
‘involuntary servitude’ as punishment for their crime.”302 Richard M. Re
and Christopher M. Re responded to Fletcher’s argument by noting that
states distinguish between disenfranchisement “on account of” past
actions and disenfranchisement “on account of” prior imprisonment,
with the former purportedly avoiding a Fifteenth Amendment
problem.303 But this distinction ignores that both disenfranchisement and
imprisonment are responses to the same action, the underlying crime of
conviction, which raises the double-punishment problem.304 This
distinction also ignores that disenfranchisement and imprisonment are
both contingent on a conviction for the past action; once the latter
encumbrance lifts, the former remains only if the person is permanently
tainted by her conviction, which is proximately connected to her
301. George P. Fletcher, Disenfranchisement as Punishment: Reflections on the Racial Uses of
Infamia, 46 UCLA L. Rev. 1895, 1904 (1999) (“‘Servitude’ seems to convey the same
meaning . . . as it does in the Thirteenth Amendment, which prohibits ‘involuntary servitude’
except as punishment for crime.”).
302. Id.
303. Re & Re, supra note 45, at 1662 (arguing that felony disenfranchisement is action based,
not status based).
304. See TRIPKOVIĆ, supra note 16, at 52–57 (discussing the background punishment theory
which gives rise to the double-punishment problem).
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previous condition of servitude under which her freedom was lawfully
qualified.
If penal law adequately responds to a crime, there should be nothing
left for the state to respond to with respect to that crime. To the extent
disenfranchisement overlaps with a sentence, it is questionable due to the
double-punishment problem. To the extent disenfranchisement extends
past a completed sentence, it must respond to something other than the
underlying crime of conviction. The constitutionality of the response
implicates the third debate: Does criminal disenfranchisement promote a
legitimate or compelling state interest? As will be shown below, the
answers tie back to the circumstances under which a state may
legitimately sever the connection between citizenship and the franchise.
C. Legitimate Government Interest to Disenfranchise
States proffer purity of the ballot box and forfeiture by breach of the
social contract as legitimate interests promoted by criminal
disenfranchisement. In considering the legitimacy of government’s
response to the underlying crime of conviction once penal sanction has
been imposed, the question arises whether securing ballot box purity or
enforcing forfeiture provides sound theoretical justification to
disenfranchise a person as an additional response to the underlying crime
of conviction.
Ballot-box purity rests on unsound and general assumptions that a
criminal conviction taints a person such that her participation would taint
electoral processes.305 A person with a criminal conviction is assumed to
lack the requisite moral compass to vote responsibly.306 These taint
arguments directly undermine the unity of purpose underlying the
Reconstruction amendments. With respect to the Thirteenth Amendment,
the problem, again, is that the state adjudges the citizen as morally and
politically irredeemable and reintroduces the worst aspects of the former
slave system, which treated even freed slaves as incapable and unworthy
of self-governance. The taint itself smacks of status-based servitude. As
to the Fourteenth Amendment, the taint argument undermines the
absolute right that one has to full citizenship status absent her voluntary
relinquishment.
The Fifteenth Amendment rejects the taint arguments outright by
excluding “previous condition of servitude” from legitimate voter305. Fletcher, supra note 301, at 1899 (“The argument of metaphysical taint has no place in a
secular legal culture, and it seems obvious that electoral officials can, with proper measures,
protect the honesty of the balloting process.”).
306. Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons, supra note 117, at 1307–08 (surveying several
decisions in which courts argue felons cannot be trusted to vote responsibly).
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qualifications. The “previous condition of servitude” the Fifteenth
Amendment’s framers had in mind was the institution of slavery, its
burdens and incidents, and the theoretical grounds that sanctioned the
practice. The slave was considered property, subject to the master’s
absolute will, lacking self-ownership and mentally and morally incapable
of self-governance. This was a permanent condition pre-Thirteenth
Amendment. The Fifteenth Amendment’s rejection of “previous
condition of servitude” as a legitimate ground on which to disenfranchise
a person rejects the taint arguments. It is an untenable position to hold
that a criminal conviction may impose on a person a condition of
servitude, fully released once she completes her sentence, but that her
criminal conviction so taints her that she may be permanently or
indefinitely disenfranchised. There is no salient difference between the
state focusing on the crime of conviction and the conviction itself in
disenfranchising the citizen with a view toward preserving ballot-box
purity. In either case, the conviction determines and, thereby, imposes
the taint—the same conviction, that is, that placed the person under a
condition of servitude.
Forfeiture by breach of the social contract might state a legitimate
ground for disenfranchisement, depending on the strength of the
theoretical account underlying such forfeiture. Richard M. Re and
Christopher M. Re offer an in-depth and illuminating theoretical account
of forfeiture by breach of the social contract, extrapolated from the
Reconstruction amendments’ legislative history.307 Many Reconstruction
Republicans, they argue, envisioned formal equality—equal treatment
for equal acts—and this vision drew on Lockean contractarian theory,
which placed criminals outside of civil society by virtue of their criminal
acts. These legislators accepted disenfranchisement for crime as a proper
exercise of state power.308
But even if some legislators harbored this view, there is no evidence
in the drafting debates that it reflected the general consensus among
supporters of the Thirteenth Amendment. Rather, some legislators
decried the exception based on the chosen words. Also, legislative
history strongly supports the view that political exigencies motivated
legislators to select familiar language in an effort to avoid any public
dispute concerning the Thirteenth Amendment’s larger implications.
Moreover, as Gabriel Chin points out, the Fifteenth Amendment did
not include any express exception for disenfranchisement for crime.
While Richard M. Re and Christopher M. Re rejoin, “the Fifteenth
307. See generally Re & Re, supra note 45.
308. Id. at 1630–41.
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Amendment included no crime exception because it did not call criminal
disenfranchisement into question,”309 this observation does not
undermine Chin’s ultimate point. The Fifteenth Amendment was
“Congress’ last word on African-American suffrage” and the omission of
a crime exception speaks against the practice insofar as “Congress
clearly recognized that criminal disenfranchisement could be used to
undermine the political status of freed slaves.”310 Chin’s argument
accords with the unity of purpose described in the Slaughter-House
Cases.311
The fact is that the United States Constitution lacks an express and
affirmative sanction for criminal disenfranchisement. Even accepting
that many Reconstruction Republicans operated under a similar belief
that criminal disenfranchisement was legitimate, the practice was only
referenced in Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which neither
expressly granted any person the right to vote nor expressly approved of
temporary or permanent criminal disenfranchisement.
Presently, American law lacks the theoretical underpinning to justify
blanket criminal disenfranchisement under any social contract theory.
Milena Tripković’s recent scholarship offers a promising theoretical
account to justify the practice. As a reminder, Tripković argues that
crime-related disenfranchisement aims not to penalize, but to denounce
one who fails to satisfy the standards of citizenship. Disenfranchisement
may be justified “as a measure stemming from the rules that regulate
one’s core membership and status and the special obligations that arise
therefrom.”312 Her account avoids the double-punishment problem by
focusing on dual-violation crimes—where an act violates both general
criminal law and a law regulating special relationships, prompting two
separate responses: one who attempts to murder a stranger violates
criminal law and may be imprisoned; one who attempts to murder his
ward, violates criminal law and family law and may be imprisoned under
the former and lose parental rights under the latter.
Under Tripković’s social contractarian theory, only a certain type of
criminal offender may justly be considered to forfeit her electoral rights
under either a liberal or republican theory—a person who completely
lacks requisite qualities, e.g., empathy and conscience, to muster the
309. Id. at 1661.
310. Chin, supra note 45, at 315 (arguing that because Congress was aware criminal
disenfranchisement could be used against freed slaves, it consciously excluded a criminal
exception to the Fifteenth Amendment).
311. Id. at 297.
312. TRIPKOVIĆ, supra note 16, at 67 (justifying criminal disenfranchisement as a noncriminal
measure to regulate group membership status).
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moral powers necessary to act justly.313 “Only those criminals who do
not possess a moral code (which can only be determined by looking at
who they are and not so much at what they have done)” would be subject
to disenfranchisement.314
Additionally, she identifies anti-state crimes and crimes that limit
another person’s membership in the polity, such as murder, as crimes
that may justify disenfranchisement. A person may lack the requisite
moral qualities to become a reliable co-member in a polity but never
commit a crime. It would be unjust to disenfranchise such a person on
the basis of what she possibly may do in the future, especially without
solid proof. The commission of a crime brings the conduct under public
scrutiny and allows the polity to assess whether the conduct
demonstrates that the criminal offender lacks the requisite capacity or
ability to become a reliable co-member.
This brings the discussion back to the primary question raised by
criminal disenfranchisement practices in the United States: under what
circumstances may a state legitimately sever the connection between
citizenship and the franchise? First, the crime should be sufficiently
serious such that it threatens to harm or seriously undermine the
existence or function of the State. Second, as when expatriation is at
stake, there must be sufficient proof not only of the crime itself, but also
sufficient proof that the offender is one who lacks the requisite moral
qualities to act justly or attain virtue over a full life. The latter burden of
proof mirrors the expatriation inquiry into whether the person intended to
relinquish her citizenship. A scheme like this avoids assumed-taint
problems and double-punishment problems, and it aligns with the unity
of purpose underlying the Reconstruction amendments.
CONCLUSION
In bitter irony, the Supreme Court relied on an obscure provision in
the Fourteenth Amendment, one of the Reconstruction amendments
aimed at securing equal liberties and rights to former slaves and
descendants of slaves, to sanction permanent disenfranchisement
practices that disproportionally dilute the voting power of Black
communities across the United States today. The Court failed to adhere
to the unity of purpose underlying the Reconstruction amendments.
Within that unity of purpose, criminal disenfranchisement as practiced in
the states likely fails to satisfy constitutional muster. The long history of
the practice is of no avail and does not legitimate the practice any more
313. Id. at 95–101.
314. Id. at 101.
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than the long history of slavery in this nation made that practice
legitimate before the Civil War. The history of the practice reveals only
“the norms and notions of what ‘just’ is isn’t always justice.”315
The Thirteenth Amendment plays a key role in determining the
validity of criminal disenfranchisement laws, as do the other
Reconstruction amendments. A judicial remedy may be available to
litigants seeking restoration of their right to vote. The challenge is to
overcome Richardson v. Ramirez. The unity of purpose underlying the
Reconstruction amendments should be the focus.

315. Amanda Gorman, The Hill We Climb (Jan. 20, 2021) (transcript available at President
Biden 2021 Inaugural Ceremony, C-SPAN, https://www.c-span.org/video/?508135-3/presidentbiden-2021-inaugural-ceremony [https://perma.cc/36Q6-98X3] (last visited Sept. 15, 2021)).

